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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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With the exception of South Africa, local financial 
markets in sub-Saharan Africa remain underdeveloped 
and small, with a particular dearth of financing with 
maturity terms commensurate with the medium- to long-
term horizons of infrastructure projects. But as financial 
market reforms gather momentum, there is growing 
awareness of the need to tap local and regional sources. 
Drawing on a comprehensive new database constructed 
for the purpose of this research, the paper assesses the 
actual and potential role of local financial systems for 
24 African countries in financing infrastructure. The 
paper concludes that further development and more 
appropriate regulation of local institutional investors 
would help them realize their potential as financing 
sources, for which they are better suited than local banks 
because their liabilities would better match the longer 
terms of infrastructure projects. There are clear signs of 
This paper—a product of the African Sustainable Development Front Office, Africa Region—is part of a larger effort in 
the region to gauge the status of public expenditure, investment needs, financing sources, and sector performance in the 
main infrastructure sectors for 24 African focus countries, including energy, information and communication technologies, 
irrigation, transport, and water and sanitation. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.
worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at jirving@worldbank.org.  
positive change: private pension providers are emerging 
in Africa, there is a shift from defined benefit toward 
defined contribution plans, and African institutional 
investors have begun taking a more diversified portfolio 
approach in asset allocation. Although capital markets 
remain underdeveloped, new issuers in infrastructure 
sectors—particularly of corporate bonds—are coming to 
market in several countries, in some cases constituting 
the debut issue. More than half of the corporate bonds 
listed at end-2006 on these countries’ markets were by 
companies in infrastructure sectors. More cross-border 
listings and investment within the region—in both 
corporate bonds and equity issues—including by local 
institutional investors, could help overcome local capital 
markets’ impediments and may hold significant promise 
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The future of infrastructure development in Africa depends on local finance. Traditionally, 
infrastructure projects in Africa have been financed by the public sector or international private investors. 
Fiscal space for domestic public sector sources of infrastructure financing is limited, however, while 
private financing sourced from abroad tends to attract high country-risk premiums and often carries the 
risk of currency mismatch as infrastructure project revenues are typically earned in local currency. Most 
of the focus countries’ local financial markets remain underdeveloped, shallow, and small in scale, with a 
particular dearth of long-term financing with maturity terms commensurate with the long-term horizon of 
infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, there is growing recognition of the need to explore the potential for 
accessing local and regional sources of private financing in building Africa’s infrastructure, particularly 
as national and intraregional financial market reforms gather increasing momentum across the countries. 
The first objective of this paper is to take a comprehensive inventory of local sources of infrastructure 
financing in the 24 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa included in the first phase of the Africa Infrastructure 
Country Diagnostic.
1 This inventory will provide a baseline against which further developments may be 
gauged.  
A second aim of this study is to identify and analyze, insofar as possible, factors contributing to the 
variance in the ability of national financial sectors to generate local financing for infrastructure projects. 
The study attempts to analyze the potential for generating infrastructure financing by specific 
infrastructure sectors (electricity generation, transport, water and sanitation, and telecommunications), 
where it has been possible to compile these specific data. A concluding section proposes general policy 
recommendations for strengthening local capacity to mobilize financing for infrastructure. 
We assess the ability of local financial markets in the 24 countries to provide long-term finance by 
examining macroeconomic fundamentals (chapter 1), financial intermediation (chapter 2), and depth of 
domestic capital markets (chapter 3). Our indicators are drawn from a comprehensive data-gathering 
exercise conducted at the national and subregional levels. The selected indicators, primarily quantitative, 
cover local and subregional banking systems, corporate and government bond markets, equity markets, 
and institutional investors, as well as overall macroeconomic conditions. We identify which countries’ 
local and regional financing sources are best able to fund infrastructure and which are the most severely 
constrained. Where useful, we make comparisons with Chile and Malaysia, the designated comparator 
countries for the AICD study.
2  
 
                                                 
1 Information on the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic, a multidonor initiative, is available at 
www.infrastructureafrica.org. AICD’s 24 focus countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
 
2 Chile and Malaysia are upper-middle-income economies that have grown considerably and reduced poverty in 
recent years by pursuing sound macroeconomic policies, structural reforms, and have deepened their financial 
markets. 2 
 
1    Macroeconomic fundamentals 
Macroeconomic stability provides the foundations for developing a national financial system that 
offers sustainable and affordable long-term finance. Sound and stable macroeconomic policies—
including disciplined fiscal policies to avoid crowding out of private investment and private-sector 
lending—are essential to the proper functioning of private financial markets. In the absence of 
macroeconomic stability, notably where inflation is high, there is a disincentive to save, because current 
earnings are worth more than future earnings in real terms, and financial markets will make available only 
short-term finance at variable rates. Infrastructure projects require long-term finance at predictable 
(preferably fixed) interest rates.  
Sound macroeconomic policies have been linked with financial sector development in the empirical 
literature.
3 Aryeetey and Nissanke (1998) found that in the absence of macroeconomic stability, the 
impact of financial liberalization and other financial sector reforms on financial deepening will be 
ineffective. Examining the relationship between macroeconomic stability and capital market 
development, Garcia and Liu (1999) found that the former, along with adequate national income and 
savings, was a prerequisite for development of capital markets in developing economies.  
A few key indicators can be used to assess macroeconomic stability as it relates to the availability of 
long-term finance. These include the volume of available savings, the gross domestic savings rate, 
inflation rates, and levels of external and domestic debt. A sovereign credit rating (for countries that have 
obtained one) can provide some indication of a country’s investment climate, creditworthiness, and its 
capacity to service existing debt (appendix 1). 
Size of the economy and volume of savings  
A key challenge facing these developing financial sectors is scale. Except for South Africa, none of 
the 24 focus countries has a gross domestic product (GDP) even close to those of the comparator 
developing countries, Chile and Malaysia (figure 1.1 and appendix 2). (South Africa’s GDP exceeds 
Malaysia’s by more than 70 percent.) Other things being equal, larger economies theoretically should 
have more potential for raising infrastructure finance, because they tend to have more resources available 
for investment. However, excluding the two largest focus economies (South Africa and Nigeria) from 
consideration, figure 1.1 shows that the larger of the remaining 22 economies do not necessarily have a 
correspondingly large volume of domestic savings. 
                                                 
3 The literature shows support for causality running both ways. Many works have found that financial development 
leads to sustainable macroeconomic growth. See, in particular, Levine (1997) for a survey of this literature. 3 
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Sources: World Bank, GEM and WDI databases. 
 
Absolute savings only cover infrastructure investment needs, estimated at 10 percent of GDP, in 12 of 
the 24 countries (table 1.1).
4 Of course, gross domestic savings represents only a theoretical upper 
threshold as an indicator of the maximum available domestic investment available for meeting estimated 
infrastructure needs. Nevertheless, it is clear that half of the countries are severely constrained in their 
ability to put domestic savings to use toward infrastructure development, given that these 12 countries 
have a shortfall between these two indicators, in some cases significant. In the case of Ethiopia, which has 
the largest shortfall, the gap between gross domestic savings and infrastructure investment needs was 
more than $2.1 billion in 2006. The five other economies that have a shortfall are all very small and/or 
postconflict countries (Cape Verde, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, and Rwanda).  
                                                 
4 According to the most recent estimates of the World Bank’s African Sustainable Development Department (Africa 
Region). 4 
 
Table 1.1. Domestic savings and infrastructure investment needs 
As of 2006 
 
Gross domestic savings  
(US$ millions) 
Estimated infrastructure  
investment needs (US$ millions) 
Difference between  
gross domestic savings and 
infrastructure investment needs 
(US$ millions) 
South Africa  41,200  25,406  15,794 
Nigeria 38,400  11,940  26,460 
Sudan 5,310  3,719  1,591 
Kenya 1,710  2,340   –630 
Cameroon 3,160  1,866  1,294 
Côte d’Ivoire  4,820  1,722  3,098 
Ethiopia   –813  1,327   –2,140 
Tanzania 1,540  1,321  219 
Ghana 1,000  1,119   –119 
Zambia 1,970  1,044  926 
Uganda 738  912   –174 
Senegal 790  831   –41 
Mozambique 1,540  761  779 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  398  815   –417 
Namibia 2,180  640  1,540 
Chad 2,750  600  2,150 
Burkina Faso  565  565   –1 
Madagascar 748  545  203 
Benin 298  520   –222 
Niger 317  355   –38 
Malawi   –189  221   –410 
Rwanda 40  246   –206 
Lesotho   –103  167   –271 
Cape Verde   –25  92   –116 
Chile 36,700  13,580  23,120 
Malaysia 62,300  14,876  47,424 
Sources: World Bank staff estimates based on GEM and WDI databases. 
 
The savings rate is an important macroeconomic indicator of an economy’s ability to generate funds 
for infrastructure. Extremely low income levels continue to keep access to basic savings instruments 
beyond the reach of most people in Sub-Saharan Africa, however. Savings rates in the region are by far 
the lowest worldwide—below 5 percent in several of the focus countries (Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Lesotho, 
Malawi, and Rwanda)—unsurprisingly, five of the six same economies that have a large shortfall in gross 
domestic savings vis-à-vis infrastructure investment needs. Several economies constitute notable 5 
 
exceptions to these very low savings rates; in nearly all cases they are oil economies (Nigeria, Chad, 
Cameroon, and Côte d’Ivoire) or resource-rich non-oil producers (Namibia and Zambia). See figure 1.2. 
Figure 1.2  African focus countries’ gross domestic savings rates 
 
Sources: World Bank, GEM and WDI databases. 
Note: The World Bank WDI database calculates gross domestic savings as the difference between GDP and total consumption. 
LIC AICD = Low-income AICD countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia).      
   
LMIC AICD = Lower-middle-income AICD countries (Cameroon, Cape Verde, Lesotho, and Namibia).  
UMIC AICD = Upper middle-income countries (South Africa).           
Oil exporters = Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria. 
Non-resource-rich = All AICD countries except Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivôire, Namibia, Nigeria, and Zambia. 
 
Using savings rates as an upper-limit proxy for funds available for investment in infrastructure, the 
countries can be grouped into four categories: those with high potential to generate domestic funds for 
infrastructure projects (Nigeria, Chad, Namibia); those with solid potential (Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique, 
Zambia, Cameroon, South Africa, Sudan, Madagascar, Tanzania); those with limited potential (Niger, 
Burkina Faso, Senegal, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Benin); and those with severely limited or no potential 
(the remaining six countries). Chad and Nigeria, which top the list, are net oil exporters with savings rates 
in excess of 35 percent. Limited capacity to absorb high oil-export revenues in the domestic economy and 
a desire to reduce debt explains why major oil exporters may be saving more of their oil export revenues. 
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The last grouping, with savings rates between 5 and –16 percent, is mostly made up of small and/or 
postconflict countries.  
The contrast with the two comparator countries, Chile and Malaysia, is striking. Both have 
substantially higher savings rates than all the focus countries except oil-rich Nigeria and Chad and non-
oil-resource intensive Namibia. Chile’s fiscal performance and savings rate have benefited recently from 
high export revenues in extractive industries (in this case, copper), as well as sound macroeconomic 
policies and strong domestic institutions.  
Domestic and external debt  
In recent years, robust GDP growth, more prudent macroeconomic policies, debt relief negotiated 
with multilateral and bilateral creditors, and, for major oil exporters, higher oil revenues have enabled 
many countries to reduce their debt-to-GDP ratios. Twenty-one of the 23 focus countries for which 
external debt to GDP ratio data are available reduced the ratio over the 2004–05 period—by more than 20 
percentage points in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, 
and Zambia (appendix 2). 
For some countries, such as Nigeria and Zambia, external debt-to-GDP ratios have fallen particularly 
significantly. Debt relief and high copper export earnings brought Zambia’s down 58 percentage points 
(to 78 percent) over the 2004–05 period. Nigeria’s external debt-to-GDP ratio fell from 50 percent in 
2004 to 22 percent in 2005, as oil windfalls enabled it to pay off nearly all its external debt to multilateral 
creditors. Several countries have also seen substantial declines in their debt burdens thanks to multilateral 
debt relief granted under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and Multilateral Debt Relief initiatives. In 
the past several years, 14 focus countries have reached the completion point under the HIPC Initiative, 
enabling them to begin receiving debt relief.  
Economies with high public-debt-to-GDP ratios can result in a crowding out of private credit. The 
extent of public borrowing from the financial system has obvious implications for the availability of bank 
credit for private enterprises. High demand for credit from government-owned enterprises and high 
overall levels of lending to the government pose structural impediments to private sector credit. However, 
as indicated in appendix table 2.3, where a number of countries have both relatively low public-debt-to-
GDP and private-bank-credit-to-GDP ratios, there must be other factors that constrain private credit. 
These are more fully discussed in the next chapter but can include high banking transaction costs and 
banks’ perceived higher risks associated with lending to the private sector. 7 
 
2    Financial intermediation and bank lending 
A minimum degree of financial intermediation is necessary to establish a market for term finance 
capable of funding infrastructure projects. This section will examine the degree to which domestic 
savings are being intermediated in the local financial sectors of the 24 focus countries.  
Except in South Africa, the region’s financial sectors tend to be characterized as having a limited 
range of investment instruments (particularly for longer tenors), with commercial banks predominating, 
and a shortage of medium- and long-term bank credit and other forms of financing. Institutional and 
regulatory frameworks are relatively weak, and institutional investors are underdeveloped or nonexistent 
in some cases. In some countries, such as Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and other countries 
of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), the effectiveness of financial 
intermediation is undermined by factors including weak payment systems and floors on lending rates and 
ceilings on deposit rates that do not reflect market fundamentals, and regulatory impediments that make 
local sources of longer-term financing costly and scarce.
5  
Among the selected indicators for assessing the level of financial depth and financial intermediation 
are (i) the total assets of financial intermediaries (and the ratio of those assets to GDP) and (ii) bank credit 
to the private sector as a share of GDP (table 2.1).  
Other traditional indicators of financial development are the ratio of broad money to GDP and the 
level of real interest rates. However, recent studies have found evidence that these latter indicators may 
produce misleading signals about the extent of financial development because they do not account for 
certain factors, such as the economy’s openness to capital flows, banking sector competitiveness, and 
government borrowing from the financial system (Pill and Pradhan 1995). Bank credit to the private 
sector as a ratio to GDP is a favored indicator of financial intermediation and financial depth in 
developing economies, but it too has flaws. It does not adequately take into account nonperforming loans 
and credit granted by nonbank financial institutions and other financial innovations. Nor does it take into 
account the impact of commercial bank lending to other financial intermediaries (Pill and Pradhan 1995) 
None of the indicators we have mentioned captures the effects of the institutional environment on 
financial depth and development (McDonald and Schumacher 2007; Gelbard and Leite 1999), which can 
be considerable.  
                                                 
5 IMF 2006a; BEAC 2007. Commercial credit is very scarce in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; banks serve 
chiefly as financial agents for the government (EIU 2006b). 8 
 
Table 2.1  Indicators for assessing financial intermediation in 24 focus countries and comparators 
Country 
Total assets of financial 
intermediaries as % GDP /a 
Private credit by deposit 
money banks as % GDP 
Longest maturity terms 
available for loans (years) 
Average lending rate 
(%) 
   end-2006 or most recent  end-2006  end-2006  end-2006 
Benin 21.6  16.1  10+  — 
Burkina Faso  21.0  19.2  10+  — 
Cameroon 12.9  9.2  —  15 
Cape Verde  107.3  63.7  5  12 
Chad 5.9  2.8  —  15 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  3.0  2.1  3  67 
Côte d’Ivoire  21.4  14.9  10+  — 
Ethiopia 14.2  23.3  —  7 
Ghana 46.9  19.9  20  26 
Kenya 52.4  25.1  10+  14 
Lesotho 26.7  7.5  20  12 
Madagascar /b  16.2  10.9  See note b  30 
Malawi 23.3  9.0  5  29 
Mozambique 21.5  11.3  10+  19 
Namibia 165.5  61.5  20  11 
Niger 10.7  9.0  10+  — 
Nigeria 25.7  12.6  5+  17 
Rwanda 25.1  13.9  10  +  16 
Senegal 32.2  26.7  10+  — 
South Africa  192.1  76.5  20  11 
Sudan 17.0  13.8  —  11 
Tanzania 22.9  11.7  5  +  15 
Uganda 23.5  8.1  20  19 
Zambia 17.8  8.1  20  23 
Chile 156  71  25  8.0 
Malaysia 199  118  —  6.5 
Sources: International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics; central banks and finance ministries. 
— = Not available.  
a. Due to asset data limitations for pension systems and insurance sectors in several countries, the reported figures may be under- or 
overestimates. Total deposit money bank assets data in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Nigeria are current for end-2005. 
b. In Madagascar, the seven commercial banks offer only very basic savings and credit vehicles to select clients; bank loans to the 10 largest 
corporate clients comprised nearly one-quarter of the banking sector’s total corporate loan portfolios (IMF, 2006e). 
Assets of financial intermediaries 
The total amount of domestically available funds, as indicated by the total assets of financial 
intermediaries in the country, provides a theoretical maximum that these entities could possibly invest in 
infrastructure. Depending on the particular national regulatory environment (for example, regulations 
governing institutional investor investments of their assets and specific restrictions on asset allocation), 
some proportion of these funds could be invested in infrastructure (see chapter 4).  9 
 
South Africa’s financial sector is much larger and more developed than those of the other focus 
countries. The total assets of deposit money banks in South Africa amounted to $211.2 billion at the end 
of 2006, more than triple the total assets of the 23 other African focus countries combined ($64.8 billion). 
South Africa’s bank assets are twice the size of Chile’s and about 10 percent greater than those of 
Malaysia.  
The disparity is still larger when comparing estimated total assets of financial intermediaries for 
South Africa with the combined total for the other 23 African countries. Reflecting South Africa’s well-
developed pension and insurance subsectors, the total assets of South Africa’s financial intermediaries 
(estimated at $465.3 billion at end-2006) are more than five times greater than the combined total of the 
other 23 African focus countries. As a percentage of GDP, the total assets of South Africa’s financial 
intermediaries (192.1 percent) are also much greater than those of the other focus countries, except 
Namibia (165.5 percent), with which South Africa has extensive financial and economic connections,
6 
and Cape Verde (107.3 percent).
7 The next highest ratio is only 52.4 percent (Kenya). Five countries have 
ratios between 25 and 50 percent; 15 countries have ratios below 25 percent.  
Interestingly, Namibia tops the list in total pension system assets as a percentage of GDP. At 58 
percent, it exceeds the South African pension system’s ratio by 21 percentage points (table 2.2). The basis 
for Namibia’s pension system was acquired on obtaining independence in the late 1940s (albeit with 
extremely limited coverage in its early form), and pension funds have grown rapidly since, driven by 
private sector growth. Namibia’s high ratios must be viewed in the context of the (small) size of the 
country’s economy. The country’s estimated total pension system assets (at $3.3 billion) are far less than 
South Africa’s ($80.2 billion).
8 South Africa’s estimated total insurance sector assets (at $173.9 billion) is 
77 times the counterpart figure for Namibia ($2.24 billion). The rest of the focus countries trail far behind. 
Thus, institutional investors play a relatively predominant role as financial intermediaries in South 
Africa compared with the other African focus countries. According to the data in table 2.2, total estimated 
assets of South African institutional investors (based on the combined assets of insurance companies and 
pension funds) were $254.1 billion, or 109 percent of GDP. This number is likely a significant 
underestimate, given the lack of recent data for South African pension fund assets, and that this figure 
                                                 
6 These links antedate Namibia’s independence from South Africa in 1990. Namibia’s four commercial banks 
continue to have strong ties with South Africa’s banking sector. Three of them are subsidiaries of South African 
banks; the fourth has a South African bank as its largest shareholder (IMF 2007c). 
7 In Cape Verde, the banking sector accounts for the vast majority of financial intermediaries’ assets. The ratio of 
banking sector assets to GDP has increased rapidly, from 70 percent at end-2004 (IMF 2006b) to 86.7 percent at 
end-2006, with lending concentrated heavily in the real estate and construction sectors. Even more so than in the 
case of Namibia, the relatively high ratio of bank assets to GDP also reflects the small size of the country’s economy 
relative to the financial sector: With nominal GDP in 2006, at $919 million, Cape Verde’s economy was by far the 
smallest of all the AICD countries. 
8 Data on pension fund assets in Namibia and South Africa are rough estimates, given that the figures are dated 
(2004). Namibia’s nonbank regulator, Namibia Financial Institutions Supervisory Authority (NAMFISA), is 
reportedly limited in its capacity to compile comprehensive, accurate and timely data (IMF 2007c). According to 
South Africa’s Financial Services Board release of 2005 data was delayed until September 2007. Data on South 
African pension fund assets include statistics for privately administered funds, which represent 3,407 of the 13,603 
funds under the supervision of the regulator; the balance of 10,196 funds are underwritten funds that consist 
exclusively of insurance policies. 10 
 
excludes the considerable assets of South African mutual funds/unit trusts, which have been growing 
rapidly over the past several years.
9  
Table 2.2  Assets of financial intermediaries as a percentage of GDP in focus countries and comparators 
As of end-2006 or most recently available 
Country 
Deposit money 











assets as % 
GDP 
Total assets of 
financial 
intermediaries as % 
GDP 
Benin 17.0  125.0  3.1  71.9  1.5  21.6 
Burkina Faso  20.0  —  —  53.0  1.0  21.0 
Cameroon 11.6  —  —  252.4  1.5  12.9 
Cape Verde  86.7  170.0  18.5  18.9  2.1  107.3 
Chad 5.5  n.a.  n.a.  9.9  0.4  5.9 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep.  2.6 n.a.  n.a.  18.8  0.3  3.0 
Côte d’Ivoire  18.5  —  —  491.2  3.0  21.4 
Ethiopia 12.6  —  —  171.9  1.5  14.2 
Ghana 34.9  1,076.7  10.9  96.9  1.1  46.9 
Kenya 36.0  1,770.3  9.4  1,308.7  7.0  52.4 
Lesotho 12.8  —  —  250.5  13.9  26.7 
Madagascar 13.2  62.4  1.2  89.7  1.8  16.2 
Malawi 13.3  n.a.  —  221.6  10.0  23.3 
Mozambique 18.6  —  —  198.4  2.9  21.5 
Namibia  68.3  3,312.0  58.0  2,240.0  39.2  165.5 
Niger 10.0  78.7  2.2  22.7  0.7  10.7 
Nigeria 20.6  3,507.8  2.9  1,575.2  1.6  25.7 
Rwanda 16.0  132.7  7.4  27.7  1.7  25.1 
Senegal 30.3  —  —  149.9  1.9  32.2 
South Africa  83.1  80,202.3  37.0  173,913.0  72.0  192.1 
Sudan 16.8  —  —  96.1  0.6  17.0 
Tanzania 17.6  577.9  4.4  123.5  1.0  22.9 
Uganda 17.3  470.6  5.2  70.4  1.0  23.5 
Zambia 13.6  314.1  3.0  121.1  1.2  17.8 
Chile 71.7  88,293.5  65.0  25,542.6  18.8  155.5 
Malaysia 125.2  69,659.0  53.2  30,715.9  20.6  199.1 
Sources: Pension system and insurance sector asset data sourced from national pension funds and financial authorities; CEMA for the five 
WAEMU countries and Cameroon; Axco country reports. 
Note: Total pension and insurance sector assets are underestimated for several countries. 
— = Not available; n.a. = Not applicable.  
 
Although three of the African focus countries have relatively high ratios of total assets of financial 
intermediaries to GDP (Cape Verde, at 107.3 percent, as well as South Africa and Namibia), the next 
                                                 
9 As of end-June 2006, South Africa’s 678 mutual funds (unit trusts) managed an estimated $62.76 billion in assets, 
up from $52 billion in assets managed by 567 funds one year earlier (EIU 2006a, which cites the Unit Trusts 
Survey). 11 
 
highest ratio is only 52.4 percent (Kenya). Five countries have ratios ranging from 25 to 50 percent, while 
as many as 15 countries have ratios below 25 percent. It is thus clear that the level of financial depth (as 
indicated by the ratio of total financial intermediaries’ assets to GDP) of the vast majority of these 
countries is very low.  
In practice, in the case of the majority of commercial banks in this region, there would be a 
significant mismatch in the maturities of assets and liabilities, given that African banks’ deposits and 
other liabilities currently tend to have largely short-term maturities (see table 2.3) while infrastructure 
projects have longer-term financing needs. Note that table 2.3 gives the maximum available tenors and, in 
practice, holdings in time deposits often are for considerably shorter tenors.
10 Administratively set floors 
on bank lending rates still in effect in some countries discourage banks from accumulating deposits, while 
administrative ceilings keep yields on bank deposits artificially low, particularly at longer tenors, 
providing a disincentive to savers.  
                                                 
10 According to the Central Bank of Nigeria, for example, very few bank clients are willing to hold time deposits for 
tenors exceeding 90 days and it is virtually impossible to find time deposits with tenors exceeding 365 days. 12 
 
Table 2.3  Loans and deposits in the focus countries and comparators 
Country 
Longest term available 
for loans (years) 







   2006  2006  end-2006  end-2006 
Benin 10+  1+  —  — 
Burkina Faso  10+  1+  —  — 
Cameroon —  —  15  11 
Cape Verde  5  1+  12  9 
Chad —  —  15  11 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep.  3 1  67  52 
Côte d’Ivoire  10+  1+  —  — 
Ethiopia —  2  +  7  3 
Ghana  20 3  26 17 
Kenya   10+  1+  14  9 
Lesotho  20 1  12  8 
Madagascar  See note b  —  30  7 
Malawi 5  1  29  20 
Mozambique 10+  10+  19  8 
Namibia  20 —  11  5 
Niger  10+  1+ —  — 
Nigeria 5+  1  17  7 
Rwanda 10  +  1  16  8 
Senegal  10+  1+ —  — 
South Africa  20 —  11  4 
Sudan —  —  11  — 
Tanzania 5  +  2  15  9 
Uganda  20 2  19  10 
Zambia  20 7  23 13 
Chile 25  2  8  3 
Malaysia —  5+  6  3 
Sources: Central banks; IMF IFS. Data for 2006 with the exception of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria. and Rwanda (2005). 
— = Not available.  
a. Lending rates can differ significantly according to borrower creditworthiness and financing objectives. 
b. Madagascar’s seven commercial banks offer only very basic savings and credit vehicles to select clients. 
 
The unwillingness to tie up savings in relatively low-yielding bank time deposits is demonstrated by 
the relatively high share of demand deposits in total bank deposits in the focus countries. That share 
exceeds 40 percent in 17 countries, contrasting with the ratios of 14 percent and 16 percent for Chile and 
Malaysia (figure 2.1). Given that total deposits in some countries (such as the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo) comprise a large amount of foreign currency deposits held abroad for some countries, the actual 13 
 
share of bank time deposits in total deposits may be even lower than shown in figure 2.1.
11 Moreover, 
structural constraints to lending still in place in several of these countries (discussed below) mean that 
banks tend to be highly risk averse.  
Figure 2.1  Demand deposits as a share of total bank deposits  










































































































































































































Source: International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics. 
Note: Data for 2006 with the exception of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and Rwanda (2005). 
 
The typical financial liabilities of institutional investors, which are largely medium- to long-term, 
would better match the longer terms of infrastructure projects. Pension funds and insurance companies 
would thus seem to have significant potential as sources of medium- to long-term financing. But 
institutional investors in Africa remain largely underdeveloped, impeded by factors that can include a 
continued predominance of state-controlled pension funds/systems in a number of countries and a lack or 
small number of private pension funds, underdeveloped capital markets and a narrow range of alternative 
financial investment instruments, investment practices that consequently often favor illiquid real estate 
holdings, short-term bank deposits and government securities, and inappropriate or nonexistent 
regulations governing investment of their assets (see chapter 4 on institutional investors). Moreover, these 
institutional investors lack the ability to undertake the credit-risk evaluation necessary to involve 
themselves in infrastructure projects. The nature of the risks to which infrastructure projects are exposed 
would necessitate the development of some mechanism(s) for sharing and/or reducing risks associated 
with investments in infrastructure projects. In Chile, a public-private risk-sharing arrangement that 
evolved during the late 1990s centered on the issuance of local currency-denominated bonds for 
infrastructure financing of government road construction projects. A private monoline insurance 
company,
12 and the Inter-American Development Bank as coguarantor, provided a financial guarantee on 
future timely payment of interest on the project financing. This long-term financing instrument eliminated 
the need for potential investors in the bond to undertake specialized credit risk evaluation. By mitigating 
                                                 
11 Banks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo moved many of their assets abroad during the civil war earlier in 
this decade (Beck and Honohan 2007). 
12 A monoline insurance company provides guarantees to issuers, which enhance the credit of the issuer. 14 
 
the project risk, the guarantees enabled Chilean institutional investors to invest in these issues, which 
were well-suited for infrastructure projects, with maturity terms typically for 20 years, at fixed-rate terms, 
and denominated in a local inflation-adjusted unit of account. Chile’s A– credit rating paved the way for 
the monoline insurers’ participation in these arrangements. 
Ratio of private bank credit to GDP as an indicator of financial depth 
A typical indicator for measuring the degree of financial intermediation by the banking sector is the 
ratio of private credit by banks to GDP (table 2.4).
13 Three countries have high ratios of private credit by 
banks to GDP: South Africa (77 percent), Cape Verde (64 percent), and Namibia (62 percent). But the 
level of financial intermediation is low for the majority of the focus countries. Eighteen of the 24 
countries have ratios of private credit by banks to GDP below 20 percent; eight are below 10 percent, two 
of which have ratios below 3 percent. In these countries, official development assistance remains a critical 
source of external financing (appendix 3). 
Table 2.4  Private credit by banks as a share of GDP  
  West Africa  Central Africa  East Africa  Southern Africa 
< 10%  Niger  Cameroon, Chad, 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Uganda Lesotho,  Malawi, 
Zambia 
10–20%  Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ghana (19.9%) 




20–50% Senegal   Ethiopia,  Kenya   
50–75%  Cape Verde       Namibia 
> 75%        South Africa  
 
Bank credit to the private sector in these countries has been constrained by various factors that can 
include underdeveloped domestic financial markets, poor credit discipline, poor enforcement of creditors’ 
rights and overall deficiencies in national legal and judicial frameworks, and a shortage of creditworthy 
borrowers and projects. Other factors include high banking transaction costs, ceilings on bank lending 
rates that are out of line with market conditions (and that thus impede banks’ ability to price risk, as in 
CEMAC countries), and an inability of many private-sector borrowers to pledge sufficient collateral, 
often because the range of assets accepted as collateral is very narrow).
14 In many of these countries, 
banks continue to lend to a small number of corporate clients and accumulate large holdings of 
government securities. 
In economies where the oil sector is predominant and largely foreign-financed (such as Cameroon, 
Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, and Nigeria), the ratio of private sector credit to GDP is low, although not lower than 
                                                 
13 Private credit by deposit money banks is calculated as claims on the private sector by deposit money banks 
(sourced from International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics, June 2007).  
14 The value of collateral required for a loan can range considerably within countries. In Zambia, the amount 
required ranged from 50 percent to 200 percent in May 2007. In Namibia, the average value of collateral required 
for a loan in mid-2006 was 100 percent, but several firms reported that the requirement could be as high as 700 
percent (World Bank 2007d). 15 
 
several non-oil-exporting focus countries. Nevertheless, the competitiveness of the non-oil sector in major 
oil-exporting developing economies is often impeded by limited access to bank credit and other structural 
impediments, as well as overall Dutch disease effects. Countries with a commodities-dominated economic 
structure often have a shallow financial sector with a very limited role in financing non-oil economic 
activities (see, for example, IMF 2007a). A recent IMF surveillance mission in the CEMAC region 
observed that the expansion of Chad’s oil sector correlated with a decline in the competitiveness of other 
sectors (IMF 2007b). 
In all of the focus countries, the level of financial intermediation, measured by total private credit by 
banks and nonbank financial institutions as a percentage of GDP, is significantly below that of South 
Africa, where the ratio stands at 145 percent (table 2.5). Cape Verde and Namibia have the next-highest 
ratios, at 64 percent and 62 percent.
15 South Africa’s significantly higher ratio largely reflects its 
sophisticated, highly developed nonbank financial subsector. 
As well as being limited in size, bank lending to the private sector tends to be short in tenor for all but 
the most select bank clients. That said, maturities vary considerably by client, bank lender, and lending 
purpose.
16 In Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, and Senegal, maturity terms for infrastructure 
project loans vary greatly depending on the type of infrastructure financed, with some maturities in excess 
of 10 years.
17 Loans arranged by a syndicate of banks, international and local, generally have longer 
maturities. Syndicated lending to the focus countries had grown in recent years, but still remains 
relatively limited, except to borrowers in South Africa (see chapter 3).  
                                                 
15 Private credit by nonbank financial institutions data are only available from IMF IFS for Kenya (2006), Malawi 
(2006), South Africa (2005), Ethiopia (2006), and Chile (2006). Because claims on the private sector by nonbank 
financial institutions is not compiled by IMF IFS for many of the AICD countries, and given the generally small size 
of most of these countries’ nonbank financial subsectors, in these cases the value for private credit by deposit money 
banks can be used as a rough approximation for private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions. 
16 In Lesotho, for example, mortgage loans carry the longest maturity terms available for bank loans (maximum 20 
years), followed by vehicle finance loans, with a maximum of five years (Central Bank of Lesotho). 
17 According to the Banking Commission of the West African Economic and Monetary Union’s regional central 
bank, BCEAO (Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest). 16 
 
Table 2.5  Private credit by banks and other financial institutions as a percentage of GDP 
Private credit by 
deposit money 
banks as % GDP 
Private credit by 
deposit money 
banks (2006) 
Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other 
financial institutions as % 
GDP 
Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other 
financial institutions 
(2006) 
Country   end-2006  (US$ millions)  end-2006  (US$ millions) 
Benin 16.1  834.8  16.1  834.8 
Burkina Faso  19.2  1,083.6  19.2  1,083.6 
Cameroon 9.2  1,724.6  9.2  1,724.6 
Cape Verde  63.7  585.6  63.7  585.6 
Chad 2.8  170.8  2.8  170.8 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  2.1  149.4  2.1  149.4 
Côte d’Ivoire  14.9  2,563.3  14.9  2,563.3 
Ethiopia 23.3  3,090.6  26.9  3,576.1 
Ghana 19.9  2,231.9  19.9  2,231.9 
Kenya 25.1  5,868.6  25.9  6,064.3 
Lesotho 7.5  125.8  7.5  125.8 
Madagascar 10.9  591.5  10.9  591.5 
Malawi 9.0  199.1  12.1  268.7 
Mozambique 11.3  856.9  11.3  856.9 
Namibia 61.5  3,936.4  61.5  3,936.4 
Niger 9.0  319.4  9.0  319.4 
Nigeria 12.6  15,012.6  12.6  15,012.6 
Rwanda 13.9  296.6  13.9  296.6 
Senegal 26.7  2,221.8  26.7  2,221.8 
South Africa  76.5  194,296.7  144.8  367,986.3 
Sudan 13.8  5,127.1  13.8  5,127.1 
Tanzania 11.7  1,542.6  11.7  1,542.6 
Uganda 8.1  734.4  8.1  734.4 
Zambia 8.1  842.8  8.1  842.8 
Chile 70.9  96265.9  86.5  117,489.1 
Malaysia 117.6  174885.2  117.6  174,885.2 
Source: IMF IFS June 2007. 
Note: Private credit by deposit money banks is calculated as claims on the private sector by deposit money banks. 
 
The longest reported maturities for bank loans in the focus countries are still several years shorter 
than in Chile (see table 2.3), in which the longest terms for bank loans are 25 years (for road 
construction).
18 Financial sector officials in Ghana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia 
reported maximum maturity terms of 20 years, the longest such maturities among the focus countries. 
Eight other countries reported maximum loan maturities of “10 years plus,” while maximum maturities in 
four countries were reported as five or more years. Even where 20-year terms are reportedly available, 
they may not be affordable for infrastructure purposes. In Ghana and Zambia, for example, average 
                                                 
18 According to La Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras (SBIF), Chile’s regulator of banks and 
other financial institutions. 17 
 
lending rates exceed 20 percent. This is because it is difficult to find infrastructure projects that generate 
sufficient returns to cover a cost of debt that is greater than 20 percent.  
The share of total bank loans used to finance infrastructure has been on an overall upward trend in 
recent years (table 2.6). Of the 20 focus countries that reported these figures for the most recent two 
consecutive years, 12 countries showed an increase in bank loans outstanding to sectors that develop 
infrastructure. For Lesotho, the increase was particularly dramatic, with the figure rising from 2 percent in 
2005 to 43 percent in 2006. In four other countries, the share of outstanding local bank loans for 
infrastructure remained stable over the most recent two years, at relatively high levels in two of these 
countries (Niger and Senegal). Three countries (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Rwanda) reported a drop in the 
last two years. The largest decline in the allocation of local bank loans for infrastructure occurred in 
Benin (dropping from 18 to 12 percent over 2005–06). 
These figures vary widely from country to country—from nil in Chad to 45 percent in Cape Verde. 
The absolute amount of the lending, except in South Africa and Nigeria, is small compared with the 
situation in the comparator countries. After Nigeria, which reported just over $2.4 billion in bank loans 
outstanding to infrastructure sectors at end-2006, the next-largest amount outstanding in a focus country, 
at $575 million, was in Kenya.  
Box 2.1  Bank lending to infrastructure sectors in Chile and Malaysia 
The African focus countries compare fairly well overall with comparator countries Chile and Malaysia in terms of 
the share of bank lending going to infrastructure sectors (table 2.6). However, the total amount of outstanding 
loans to infrastructure sectors is dramatically lower than corresponding amounts for Chile and Malaysia in all 
focus countries except South Africa (for example, at $7.2 billion for Chile and $5 billion for Malaysia, and less 
than $500 million for all but three countries). Excluding South Africa, the total amount of outstanding loans for 
infrastructure sectors for all African focus countries for which these data are available ($5 billion for the 22 other 
countries) is equivalent to just under the corresponding amount for Malaysia alone and is $2.2 billion less than the 
corresponding amount for Chile alone. Moreover, the infrastructure financing needs of many African focus 
countries are greater than those for upper-middle-income countries.  
Sixty-four percent of Chile’s outstanding bank loans for infrastructure ($7.2 billion at the end of 2006) was for 
the construction of roads, railways, ports, and airports; 29 percent was for electricity generation, water, and 
sanitation; and 8 percent was for telecommunications. The proportion of electricity generation and water and 
sanitation loans was up 12 percentage points from year-end 2005 while telecoms’ proportion dropped 6 
percentage points; the share of construction of roads, rail, ports, and airports declined 5 percentage points. 
In Malaysia, transport, storage, and communication attracted 56 percent of the total $5 billion in bank loans for 
infrastructure development purposes as of March 2006 (up slightly from just over half a year earlier). Twenty-six 
percent went to electricity, gas and water supply, down from 30 percent a year earlier.  
Nearly three-quarters, or just under $5 billion, of the total syndicated lending to borrowers in Chile went to 
infrastructure development. As in the African countries, excluding South Africa, transport infrastructure received 
the most money from syndicated loans in Chile and Malaysia in 2006, attracting 36 percent ($1.8 billion) and 20 
percent ($476 million), respectively, of such lending. Electricity generation ranked second in Chile as a 
destination for syndicated lending for infrastructure sectors, attracting 34 percent of the total in 2006, followed by 
telecommunications with 22 percent. Telecommunications, driven by mobile-phone service providers, attracted 
$1.22 billion, or just over half of all syndicated lending for infrastructure in Malaysia. 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia and La Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras de Chile. 
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Table 2.6  Share of total bank loans outstanding used for infrastructure financing 
Infrastructure loans as 
% total bank loans /a 
Infrastructure loans as 
% total bank loans /a 
Total outstanding loans to 
infrastructure sectors (US$ 
millions) /b 
Country  2005 2006  2006 
Benin 18  12  123.6 
Burkina Faso  8  10  84.5 
Cameroon —  —  — 
Cape Verde  24  45  107.6 
Chad 0  0  0.0 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  8  —  5.8 
Côte d’Ivoire  16  15  334.7 
Ethiopia 6  7  247.9 
Ghana 6  8  177.9 
Kenya   7  9  574.5 
Lesotho 2  43  20.9 
Madagascar 3  3  67.6 
Malawi 5  9  17.4 
Mozambique 6  6  60.7 
Namibia 3  4  117.1 
Niger  20  20 66.5 
Nigeria 11  12  2,443.6 
Rwanda 10  8  25.6 
Senegal  12  12 286.0 
South Africa  2  3  6,274.9 
Sudan 8  9  5.2 
Tanzania 8  —  93.0 
Uganda 7  8  74.9 
Zambia —  7  72.9 
Chile 10  11  7,213 
Malaysia 4  3  5,023.8 
Source: National and regional central banks and finance ministries. 
a. Data for 2005–06 or most recently available consecutive two years.  
b. Data for end-2006 with the exception of: Democratic Republic of the Congo (end-2003), Madagascar (end-2004), Namibia (end-June 2005), 
Tanzania (end-2005), Ghana (June 2006), South Africa (end-September 2006), Zambia (May 2007), and Chad and Malaysia (March 2006). 
— = Not available. 
 
Differences in the categorization of economic sectors by central banks in several countries make it 
difficult to rank specific infrastructure sectors by receipts of local bank lending. Despite the limited local 
bank lending data by infrastructure sector, certain trends can be identified. The “transport, 
communication, and storage” sector, although quite broad, can be identified as the recipient of the largest 
amount of total local bank loans outstanding in 2006 (or the most recent year) for the 23 African focus 
countries that compile and report these data (table 2.7). The category accounted for just over $8.3 billion, 
or just under three-quarters of the $11.3 billion in total loans outstanding for infrastructure purposes. Of 
this amount, $232.5 million was allocated to the narrower “transport” category (by Madagascar, 19 
 
Tanzania, and Uganda), $2.5 million to road construction (Zambia), $1 million to airport projects 
(Zambia), and $33.1 million to telecommunications projects (Zambia). Cape Verde’s central bank 
reported a further $21.3 million of bank loans outstanding for construction of public works related to 
infrastructure.  
Electricity, water, and gas/public utilities received the next-largest amount, $2.7 billion, or just under 
one-quarter of the total $11.3 billion in loans outstanding for infrastructure financing in the focus 
countries. Of this amount, $29 million was identified as going specifically to electricity generation 
(Zambia) and $1.8 million to water and sanitation (Zambia). 
Bank lending in some of the focus countries remains characterized by a concentration of lending to a 
few sectors. Even where bank lending has become more diversified across economic sectors, banks often 
concentrate their lending to a few large, corporate, blue-chip borrowers. Chad is an extreme example. 
Bank lending in Chad finances the annual cotton crop (with government guarantees); in the infrastructure 
arena, they lend only to cell-phone operators, which are multinational companies with their own sources 
of financing. Government borrowing for infrastructure purposes is limited to official sources.  
As discussed above, there remains a dearth of bank financing at longer maturities in many countries, 
reflecting the predominantly short-term nature of banks’ deposits and other liabilities. Longer-term 
deposits are needed to finance long-term credit commitments. In Rwanda, for example, nearly half of the 
total outstanding credit at the end of 2006 had maturities of one year or less. 
For the majority of the 24 countries, the capacity of local banking systems is too small and 
constrained by structural impediments to adequately finance infrastructural development. There may be 
somewhat more potential in this regard for syndicated lending to infrastructure projects with the 
participation of local banks, which has been on an overall trend of increase in recent years, albeit with 
significant variability across the 24 countries (see the next chapter on syndicated bank lending for 
infrastructural development).  
 20 
 
Table 2.7  Allocation of total bank loans outstanding by infrastructure sector 















































































































































































































































































Benin        82.4     41.2     123.6  1,009.0  12 
Burkina Faso        74.9     9.6     84.5  817.9  10 
Cameroon  — — — — — — — — — 
Cape Verde        28.3     58.0  21.3  107.6  239.6  45 
Chad  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  270.7 0 
Congo, Dem. Rep.           5.8        5.8  70.0  8 
Côte d’Ivoire        271.7     63.0     334.7  2,267.3  15 
Ethiopia        243.8     4.1     247.9  3,314.2  7 
Ghana           177.9        177.9  2,156.6  8 
Kenya         574.5           574.5  6,438.7  9 
Lesotho           20.9        20.9  48.7 43 
Madagascar  67.6                 67.6  2,164.4  3 
Malawi        14.0     3.4     17.4  186.7  9 
Mozambique        60.7           60.7  986.7  6 
Namibia        93.1     24.0     117.1  3,003.7  4 
Niger        49.0     17.5     66.5  329.2  20 
Nigeria        1,360.8     1,082.8     2,443.6  19,765.9  12 
Rwanda        24.8     0.8     25.6  311.4  8 
Senegal        193.1     92.8     286.0  2,301.8  12 
South Africa        5,011.0     1,263.8     6,274.9  249,020.2  3 
Sudan        5.2           5.2  55.3  9 
Tanzania  93.0                 93.0  1,222.7  8 
Uganda  71.9           3.0     74.9  997.5  8 
Zambia  3.5  33.1     5.5  30.7     72.9  1,088.7  7 
Total AICD  236.0  33.1  8,087.5  210.2  2,694.7  21.3  11,282.7  298,066.8  4 
Chile        2,900.3     2,085.9     7,213.4  63,063.8  10 
Malaysia        2,790.6     1,322.8  910.3  5,023.8  155,153.6  3 
Sources: National central banks, finance ministries, and other national financial authorities. 
a. Data for end-2006 with the exception of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (end-2003), Madagascar (end-2004), Namibia (end-June 
2005), Tanzania (end-2005), Ghana (June 2006), South Africa (end-September 2006), Zambia (May 2007), and Chad and Malaysia (March 
2006). 
b. Breakdown by type of public works financing (for infrastructure versus other public works) is not available. 




3    Syndicated bank lending for infrastructure 
development 
Syndicated lending represented an increasingly important source of private financing for developing 
country borrowers in recent years, including some of the African focus countries, which had grown 
considerably in the past few years—a trend largely attributable to the favorable external financing 
environment characterized by ample global liquidity that prevailed until recently.
19 The proportion of total 
syndicated lending to the focus countries for infrastructure development purposes also increased in recent 
years (table 3.1), although varying greatly from country to country. The number of loans transacted (eight 
loans in 2006 for all 24 countries, little changed from the tallies in 2000 and 2005), was still modest. 
Nevertheless, this source of financing continued to evolve. Some of the loan facilities arranged for these 
countries in 2006 were considered landmark project financing deals—because of their structure and/or 
size—within the borrowers’ countries of origin. 















loans    
   2000 2000 2005 2005 2006 2006 
Total syndicated loans for infrastructural development                   
to focus countries excluding South Africa:  138  5  431  4  1,178  5 
    of which:                   
Telecommunications,  wireless/mobile  51 2  177 3  270 2 
Telecommunications-services  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Construction/building of infrastructure  0  0  0  0  211  1 
Transportation  and  shipping  70 1  254 1  680 1 
Utilities, electric power  18  2  0  0  17  1 
Utilities,  water  supply  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total syndicated loans (all purposes) to countries exc. South Africa  790     2,668     4,315    
% of total for infrastructure sectors: Focus countries exc. South Africa  18     16     27    
Total syndicated loans for infrastructural development to South Africa:  475  2  0  0  5,081  3 
    of which:                   
Telecommunications,  wireless/mobile  475 2 0 0  4,605 2 
Construction/building of infrastructure  0  0  0  0  475  1 
Total syndicated loans (all purposes) to South Africa  9,800     3,115     11,105    
% of total for infrastructure sectors: South Africa   5     0     46    
Source: Dealogic Loanware. 
 
                                                 
19 Note this subsection draws entirely on data for syndicated loan transactions from Dealogic’s Loanware dataset. 
Although Loanware is considered to be the most comprehensive dataset available for syndicated loan transactions, 
its dataset also includes bilateral loans, where these are reported. 22 
 
Total syndicated lending to borrowers in the 23 focus countries, excluding South Africa
20, for 
infrastructure development purposes grew from $138 million in 2000 to $1.18 billion in 2006. Lending 
rose more than 173 percent in 2005–06. The increase in infrastructure lending as a share of total lending 
increased less significantly, however, rising from 16 percent to 27 percent in the same period. It must also 
be noted that the $1.18 billion loaned in 2006 went to borrowers in only 3 of the 23 countries: Kenya, 
Nigeria, and Zambia. Nearly half of the syndicated lending transacted in 2006 for borrowers in South 
Africa went to infrastructure. In Chile, three-quarters (just under $5 billion) of the total syndicated 
lending went to infrastructure development (table 3.2). 
Table 3.2   Syndicated loans for infrastructure development in Chile and Malaysia 
Amount in US$ millions unless otherwise specified; number of loans 
   2006  No. of loans 
Total syndicated loans for infrastructural development to Chile:  4,978.4  16 
    of which:       
Telecommunications, wireless/mobile  369.6  2 
Telecommunications-telephone, internet and other services  725  1 
Transportation, ship  900.0  2 
Transportation, rail  817.6  4 
Transportation, services  77.4  1 
Utilities, electric power  1710.0  5 
Utilities, water supply and treatment  378.8  1 
Total Dealogic loans for all purposes to Chile  6,729.8  48 
Share of total toward infrastructural development: Chile (%)  74    
Total syndicated loans for infrastructural development to Malaysia:  2414.7  7 
    of which:       
Telecommunications, wireless/mobile  880  1 
Telecommunications-telephone, internet and other services  343.5  1 
Transportation, ship  246.25  2 
Transportation, ar  230  1 
Utilities, electric power  715  2 
Utilities, water supply and treatment  0  0 
Total Dealogic loans for all purposes to Malaysia  7,668.9  28 
Share of total toward infrastructural development: Malaysia (%)  31    
Source: Dealogic Loanware. 
 
The transport-shipping sector received the majority of lending for infrastructure development in the 
focus countries (excluding South Africa), followed by telecoms in all three years covered in table 3.1. In 
each of these years, however, a single large loan constituted the entire amount going to transport and 
shipping. Although telecommunications ranked second as a borrowing destination for infrastructure 
development lending to the 23 countries, at $270 million the amount loaned was considerably smaller 
than the amount borrowed by South African telecoms firms.  
                                                 
20 The remainder of this analysis, except where specified, will focus on lending to the low- and lower-middle-income 
AICD countries (that is, excluding South Africa). 23 
 
Following a year in which there was no new syndicated lending for infrastructure sectors, the $5.1 
billion in syndicated lending to South Africa in 2006 dwarfed the corresponding amount loaned to the 23 
other countries. This lending comprised two exceptionally large transactions, totaling $4.6 billion, for two 
South African companies in the cellular telecommunications sector. Mobile Telephone Networks, Ltd. 
borrowed $3.5 billion (of which $2.5 billion was U.S.-dollar-denominated, the remainder Rand-
denominated) in a multitranche facility, with maturity terms ranging from one to five years. The loan was 
used to support the $5.5 billion acquisition of Investom and to refinance a bridge loan taken out 
previously the same year. The other large loan, a Rand-denominated $1.1 billion, five-year term loan, was 
borrowed by Vodacom Group for general corporate purposes.  
In Chile and Malaysia, transport infrastructure received 36 percent ($1.8 billion) and 20 percent ($476 
million), respectively, of total syndicated lending to infrastructure borrowers. Electricity generation 
ranked second in Chile as a destination for syndicated lending to infrastructure sectors; it received 34 
percent of the total in 2006, followed by telecommunications, which received 22 percent. 
Telecommunications, driven by mobile-phone service providers, received just over half, or $1.2 billion, of 
syndicated lending to infrastructure in Malaysia. 
Of the 23 other focus countries, Nigeria was the top destination country for loans financing 
infrastructure development in 2006 (table 3.3), borrowing $890.6 million. Of this, $680 million went to 
Bonny Gas Transport, in two tranches of 12 and 12.5 years, for construction of a liquefied natural gas 
train. The other $210.6 million went to a four-tranche loan for United Cement Co. (UNICEM), with 
maturities ranging from four to nine years, toward construction of a 47MW power plant in Calabar, 
Nigeria. Kenya ranked second as a destination in 2006. Its $181.9 million loan went to borrowers in 
telecoms (Safaricom, $165.1 million) and electrical utilities (Iberafrica Power, $16.8 million). Zambia 
was the third destination country for a syndicated lending to infrastructure development in 2006. There, 
cellular telecoms company Celtel borrowed $105 million for capital expenditure purposes.
21 
                                                 
21 Sudan (Al Manara Water Co.) and Mozambique (Fundo do Investimento e Patrimonio do Abastecimento de Agua, 
FIPA) attracted a further $93.3 million and $38.8 million, respectively, in bilateral loan deals tracked by Dealogic, 
for financing of a water treatment plant (Sudan) and upgrading and expansion of water supply services within the 
Greater Maputo metropolitan area (Mozambique). 24 
 
Table 3.3 Characteristics of syndicated loan transactions for infrastructure sectors in 2006 
Borrower/country of 
domicile  Sector 
Amount 
(US$ 
millions)  Currency Maturity  Pricing 







Transactions for borrowers in AICD countries excluding South Africa in 2006 
Safaricom, Kenya  Telecoms  165.1 
Ksh, 3 
tranches  5 years 
91 day tbill, 
100BP 
4 local; 1 South African bank 
(Standard Bank); 4 developed 
country banks  50.9 
Celtel Zambia, Zambia  Telecoms  105.0 
kwacha & 
US$, 2 
tranches  5 years  Undisclosed 
2 local; 2 South African 
banks; 1 Mauritian; 6 
developed country  Undisclosed 
UNICEM, Nigeria 
Construction 
of power plant  210.6 
naira & US$, 4 
tranches 
4-, 7-, & 9-
yrs.  Undisclosed 
8 local; 1 U.S. bank 
(Citibank); 1 local affiliate of 
regional Ecobank  Undisclosed 
BGT 
Transport 






LIBOR + 75 
BP 
12 major developed country 




utility  16.8 
US$, 1 
tranche  5 years  Undisclosed 
1 local; Banque de Afrique 
(Benin); 1 local subsidiary of 
Stanbic Bank (South Africa); 2 
U.K. banks  Undisclosed 
Transactions for borrowers in South Africa in 2006 
MTN, Ltd.  Telecoms  3,467.9 
US$ & Rand, 
3 tranches 
5 yrs. (2 





2 local; 15 major developed 
country; 1 Chinese bank 
(BoC)  Undisclosed 
Vodacom Group  Telecoms  1,137.6 
Rand, 1 
tranche  5 years  Undisclosed 
4 local; 1 German 




of toll road  475.3 
Rand, 2 
tranches 
1 yr & 20 
yrs.  Undisclosed  3 local banks  475.3 
Source: Dealogic Loanware. 
a. Where this is disclosed. Note that actual participation by each bank in a given loan transaction is not always provided to Dealogic given 
variance in disclosure practices across bank syndicates. 
 
The proportion of syndicated loans for infrastructure denominated in local currencies has been rising 
in the focus countries since 2000. Sixty-six percent of the total syndicated lending to infrastructure in 
2006, as tracked by Loanware, was denominated in U.S. dollars ($773 million).
22 The remaining $404.8 
million (just over one-third) was denominated in local currency. In contrast, none of the syndicated loans 
arranged in 2000 for borrowers in the 23 countries was denominated in local currency, and only 17 
percent ($77.2 million, for a loan to cellular-phone company Celtel Nigeria) in 2005 was denominated in 
local currency. None of the syndicated loans for infrastructure purposes transacted in 2006 for borrowers 
in Chile and Malaysia was denominated in local currency. These last mentioned loans were U.S.-dollar-
denominated with the exception of a $343.5 million U.S.-dollar–equivalent loan denominated in 
Singapore dollars.  
A few of the recent syndicated loans to the focus countries have been specially structured to reduce 
the risks of currency mismatch. In 2006, the majority of the U.S.-dollar-denominated lending went to 
                                                 
22 A large share of foreign-currency-denominated or foreign-indexed debt has been identified as a characteristic that 
can render an emerging market economy vulnerable to capital flow reversals and financial crisis (see, for example, 
Goldstein and Turner 1996). 25 
 
Bonny Gas (BG), a liquefied natural gas tanker owner and operator in Nigeria. BG signed a 20-year 
agreement to deliver gas to its U.S. gas marketing business based in Louisiana, United States. BG’s 
revenues, on which they will rely to service the loan, are also denominated in U.S. dollars, so the risk of a 
mismatch on the balance sheet is lower. Unicem’s (Nigeria) $210.6 million multitranche project financing 
facility, of which $57 million is dollar-denominated, set a new benchmark for naira-denominated project 
debt financing.
23 The Unicem loan was specially structured to address the mismatch between the 
company’s foreign-currency-denominated construction costs and the project income earned in local 
currency by enabling the company to pay its primary contractors in dollars accessed from the local market 
while the naira-denominated tranches served as a natural hedge for the company’s revenues earned in 
naira. Celtel Zambia’s loan, which comprised an $86 million kwacha-denominated tranche raised 
primarily from Zambian banks and international development finance institutions, was the largest locally 
raised kwacha and foreign-currency-denominated syndicated term loan with offshore participation 
arranged for a Zambian corporation to date.  
Maturity terms for borrowers’ infrastructure loans in 2006 ranged from 4 to 13.7 years, with some 
variance by borrowing sector—longer overall than the 2.5 to 5 year range in 2005 and 5 to 10 years in 
2000.
24 The longest available maturity terms in 2006 exceeded those for infrastructure borrowers in 
Malaysia (12 years) and were just over a year below those for infrastructure borrowers in Chile (15 
years). The lending facilities for African telecoms concerns in 2006 were all arranged with five-year 
maturity terms (versus five to eight years for corresponding borrowers in Chile). Loans for firms in the 
focus countries’ shipping and water utilities sectors were arranged with longer maturities of 12 to 13.7 
years. In addition to being uniquely structured to overcome the company’s particular foreign-exchange 
exposure, Unicem of Nigeria’s $210.6 million multitranche project financing facility is a landmark deal 
for the Nigerian corporate sector in that it has the longest maturity terms for naira-denominated 
syndicated loan facilities to date, with seven- and nine-year naira-denominated tranches and four- and 
seven-year dollar-denominated tranches.  
South African-based borrowers in the telecoms sector also borrowed for five-year maturity terms, 
with the exception of a three-year, $1.5 billion tranche for Mobile Telephone Networks’s (MTN) $3.47 
billion loan. The longest-tenor lending facility in 2006 for South African borrowers involved in 
infrastructure development, as tracked by Loanware, exceeded that of the other focus countries by several 
years: a 20-year loan for Trans African Concessions Pty Ltd, to refinance a facility signed in 1998 to 
support development of a Maputo Corridor Toll Road from South Africa to Mozambique. Forty-nine 
percent of South African corporate borrowing for infrastructure purposes was U.S.-dollar–denominated in 
2006. The remainder was in local currency.  
Although Dealogic reported no euro-denominated syndicated loans for infrastructure financing in the 
24 focus countries, there were a few euro-denominated loans transacted bilaterally in 2005–06 in the 
water treatment and electrical utility sectors. In fact, reported loans arranged for borrowers in the water 
sector were all bilateral.
25 Development finance institutions were prominent in these bilateral transactions, 
                                                 
23 “African Industrial Deal of the Year 2006,” Project Finance, March 1, 2007. 
24 Maturity terms are not disclosed in the case of some loans, however. 
25 Although Loanware is considered to be the most comprehensive dataset available for syndicated loan transactions, 
its dataset also includes bilateral loans where these are reported.  26 
 
particularly the European Investment Bank. South Africa’s Industrial Development Corp. loaned $93.3 
million-equivalent denominated in euros, for construction of a water-treatment facility in Sudan in 2006. 
Local banks participated in all three syndicated loans transacted for infrastructure borrowers in South 
Africa, and in four of the five transacted in the other 23 countries. Local banks also played prominent 
roles in these syndicates. For example, eight local banks participated in the financing of Nigeria’s Unicem 
in 2006, which also involved a local affiliate of the West African regional bank, Ecobank, and Citibank, 
which was the lead mandated arranger. This represents a marked change from just a few years ago. In 
2000, there were no local bank participants in any of the transactions for infrastructure sector borrowers 
in the 23 countries. In 2005, local banks participated in only one of the four syndicated loans arranged for 
infrastructure borrowers in focus countries: a $77.2 million, five-year loan to Nigeria’s M-Tel cellular-
phone company, in which five Nigerian banks (United Bank for Africa, Guaranty Trust, Zenith 
International, IBTC Chartered Bank, and Diamond Bank) and the Nigerian operations of regional bank 
Ecobank participated.  
Major South African–headquartered banks have played a big part in syndicated deals arranged for 
telecoms sector borrowers domiciled in their home country for some time and for borrowers in low- and 
lower-middle-income focus countries in 2006. Major South African banks Standard Bank and Nedcor 
participated in the two syndicated deals transacted in 2000 for infrastructure sector borrowers (mobile-
phone operators). Standard Bank provided $27.5 million while four Kenyan banks provided $50.9 million 
for a total $165 million financing facility arranged for Kenya’s telecoms company, Safaricom, in 2006. 
Similarly, two South African banks (ABSA Capital and Development Bank of South Africa) and the local 
affiliate of South Africa’s Standard Bank, along with four local banks, a Mauritian bank (Mauritius 
Commercial Bank), and international banks Citigroup and the local affiliate of Standard Chartered (U.K.), 
participated in the financing arranged for Celtel Zambia.  
Local banks were relatively infrequent participants in syndicated loans transacted for infrastructure 
sector borrowers in Chile and Malaysia as compared with the African focus countries in 2006. Only one 
of the deals in the top-borrowing transport sector, a $700 million loan for Santiago train operator, 
Empresa de Transporte de Pasajeros Metro, involved a local bank’s participation (Banco de Crédito e 
Inversiones, BCI), with a relatively minor role as one of nine banks in a syndicate involving major 
European banks. Chilean banks BCI, Banco Bice, and Banco del Estado had more prominent roles as 
mandated arrangers in a $190 million deal for mobile-phone operator Telefonica Moviles de Chile, but 
this also constituted the sole syndicated loan by a Chilean telecoms borrower with local bank participation 
in 2006. Similarly, two Chilean banks, BCI and Banco del Estado, participated in one of the five loans 
transacted in the electricity generation sector and these two banks together with Bicecorp provided 8 
percent of the total $378.8 million in syndicated loan financing of a loan for a water treatment utility. In 
Malaysia, only one of the total seven syndicated loans for infrastructure providers in 2006 involved local 
bank participation: RHB Sakura Merchant Bankers participated with Kuwait Finance House in a $230 
million loan financing commercial aircraft for national airline AirAsia. 27 
 
4    Institutional investors as a potential source of 
infrastructure financing 
In all of the African focus countries except South Africa, further financial sector development, 
including notably of institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies, is needed to 
increase the availability of longer term financing, including for infrastructure. The underdeveloped 
institutional investor base that continues to exist in nearly all of these countries also impedes overall 
capital markets development. One country, the Democratic Republic of Congo, does not even have a 
functioning pension system.
26  
A combination of factors constrains the development of insurance sectors and pension systems in 
these countries. Social security systems are very basic in many of these countries. High, widespread 
poverty prevents people from buying insurance or obtaining pension coverage. In some countries (for 
example, Ethiopia), pension systems only cover government employees, the military, civil servants, and 
state enterprise employees. Pensions paid are thus very modest and often insufficient. Postretirement 
benefits can be less than 50 percent of earnings in many cases. 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic has shortened average life spans and has taken a toll on national social 
security systems in several countries. There are also cultural reasons for the slow development of 
insurance sectors: in certain countries (in Niger, for example), some people view insurance services as 
improper because they involve speculating on an individual’s lifespan.
27 In Muslim countries such as 
Senegal and Sudan, insurance companies have been offering takaful policies to comply with sharia, since 
conventional insurance services are not permitted under Muslim law. 
Limited investment options in the African focus countries excluding South Africa make it difficult to 
achieve a balanced investment portfolio suitable for a pension fund. There is thus significant scope for 
private pension providers, which have begun marketing to private-sector employers in several countries as 
a good way to attract staff (Madagascar). There are some cases where investment allocation thresholds for 
institutional investors have been set that are too onerous to allow for compliance in practice (Tanzania’s 
insurance sector). Financial impropriety/scandal has troubled several national pension systems and some 
insurance sectors have been troubled by suspensions of activities of some companies (Uganda). 
There is a trend away from defined benefit and towards defined contribution schemes in many of 
these countries. The latter are viewed as less costly, more transparent, and easier to manage. In Nigeria’s 
reformed pension system, for example, funds are now mostly defined contribution, involving privately 
managed pension funds. Assuming this trend ultimately fosters a well-managed, appropriately regulated 
institutional investor base with private fund participation, there could be significant growth of assets 
                                                 
26 Pension system coverage in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is severely limited, in the wake of the conflict 
situation that prevailed in the 1990s. Pensions are provided by the National Social Security Institute (Institut 
National de Security Sociale, INSS), supervised by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, but only covered 
around 1 percent of the working population in the sectors it was charged with covering as of 2003, according to the 
most recently available data (Axco). 
27 Axco, various dates.. 28 
 
under management by these financial institutions in future years. In 12 of the 24 focus countries that have 
some form of operating pension system, defined benefit and defined contribution schemes concurrently 
operate; in each of these countries, defined contribution schemes are becoming more prevalent while 
defined benefit schemes have been declining under pension system reforms that allow a larger role for 
privately managed pension fund administrators. In a thirteenth country (Rwanda), policy reforms have 
been underway to transition from a defined benefit to defined contribution system. It is currently common 
for the state to administer a defined benefit scheme while complementary defined contribution pension 
schemes are provided by private-sector employers (Madagascar, Mozambique, Senegal). Under proposed 
reforms in Ghana, Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT), the largest state-run scheme, 
would likely remain a defined benefit scheme and form one tier of a three-tier pension system, the second 
tier of which would be a privately managed defined contribution scheme. Malawi’s government is also 
looking for ways to introduce a defined contribution component to the national system. 
Because pension funds are not adequately regulated in a number of the focus countries, it is not 
possible to obtain accurate data on the number of such funds or their assets and investment allocations. 
Even in South Africa, the pension fund regulator (Financial Services Board. FSB) releases very little 
timely data on the sector or individual funds (EIU 2006a). Indeed, the most recently available data from 
South Africa’s FSB as of end-2007 on pension system assets and investment breakdown was for 2004.
28 
There have been proposals and reforms to improve data and transactions reporting by pension fund 
managers to sector regulators, however. In Nigeria, the Pensions Reform Act 2004 mandates that only 
licensed pension fund administrators having a minimum capital of NGN 150 million may manage pension 
funds. Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs) must maintain accounting records of all transactions of 
investment and management of pension fund assets and report regularly on investment strategy, market 
returns and other performance indicators to the National Pension Commission (PenCom 2006). 
The lack of data makes it hard to evaluate the extent to which institutional investors in the focus 
countries invest their assets specifically in local infrastructure. Only three of the 24 countries (Cape 
Verde, Tanzania, and Uganda) have specifically reported pension system investments in local 
infrastructure (table 4.1), amounting to only a combined estimated $31.5 million, or a tiny 0.03 percent of 
total combined estimated assets of $91.8 billion for all national pension systems in the focus countries for 
which data were available.  
Cape Verde financial authorities reported the largest amount of pension system assets invested 
specifically in infrastructure, at $22.5 million (13 percent of total national pension system assets) as of 
July 2007 (figure 4.1). Most of this ($19.1 million) was invested in equity issues by telecoms concern 
Cabo Verde Telecom, and the remaining $3.4 million was newly invested in that country’s launch 
corporate bond listing on the Cape Verde stock exchange in mid-1997, by electricity generation utility 
Elektra. 
                                                 
28 Only 70 percent of the registered self-administered pension funds in South Africa provided data on the operations 
for the annual statistical report for 2004 compiled by the FSB. 29 
 
Table 4.1  Allocation of national pension system assets by infrastructure sector 







infrastructure  Country 
   US$ millions  Sector and type of funds, where known 
Benin  125 —   
Cape Verde  170  22.5 
Telecoms equities (19.1) and electrical utility 
bonds (3.4) 
Chad  n.a.  0   
Congo, Dem. 
Rep.  n.a.  0   
Ghana  1,076.7  0   
Kenya  1,770.3 —   
Madagascar   62.4   —  
Malawi —  0   
Namibia  3312 —   
Niger 79  —   
Nigeria  3,507.8  0   
Rwanda  132.7 —   
South Africa  80,202.3 —   
Tanzania /c  578   0.4  Feasibility study of Kigamboni Bridge 
Uganda  470.6  8.6  Telecoms and EADB bonds /a 
Zambia  314.1  0   
Total  91,800.5  32   
Chile /b  88,293.5 7,393   
Malaysia  69,659.0 —   
Sources: Pension system asset data sourced from national pension funds and financial authorities; Axco country reports. 
Note: Total pension assets are underestimated for several countries because national authorities do not compile data covering all funds (in 
some cases due to inadequate regulation of the sector). Pension funds assets data are for 2006 with the exception of Benin (2004), Cape 
Verde (July 2007), South Africa (2004), Rwanda (2005), Namibia (2004), Tanzania (June 2007 for National Social Security Fund), Uganda 
(June 2007), Madagascar (2005), Niger (April 2007), Nigeria (August 2007), Zambia (March 2007), and Chile (July 2007). Data breakdown not 
available for Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, 
and Sudan. 
a. East African Development Bank (EADB) provides development finance within the East African Community (EAC) to projects in sectors 
including agriculture, transport and communication, construction and manufacturing, electricity, water supply, and housing. 
b. Chilean authorities were unable to specify the pension system’s asset allocation specifically in infrastructure sectors but given that corporate 
bonds issued for financing infrastructure development as a share of total (excluding nondomestically issued as well as bank bonds and 
securitized) is 48 percent and domestically issued equity issued by firms in infrastructure sectors accounts for 27 percent of total market cap, 
one can roughly estimate that up to $3.3 billion of pension fund asset holdings were in corporate bonds issued by companies/projects in 
infrastructure sectors; and around $4 billion can be estimated as holdings in domestically issued equity issued by infrastructure 
companies/projects. 
— = Not available; n.a. = Not applicable. 
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Figure 4.1  Allocation of national pension system assets by infrastructure sector 







Cape Verde Tanzania /1 Uganda
Transport construction
Telecoms & EADB (Corp.
bonds) /1
Electricity utility (Corp. bonds)
Telecoms (Equity)
 
Sources: Pension system asset data sourced from national pension funds and financial authorities; Axco country reports. 
/1 As of July 2007, for Cape Verde. EADB provides development finance within the EAC to projects in sectors including agriculture, transport 
and communication, construction and manufacturing, electricity, water supply, and housing. For Tanzania: Cost of financing Feasibility Study of 
Kigamboni Bridge.  
 
In Uganda, 1.8 percent of total national pension system assets as of June 2007 were invested in local 
infrastructure (via total holdings of $8.6 million in corporate bonds issued by Uganda Telecom and the 
East African Development Bank, EADB). Even here, the data are incomplete and provide only a very 
rough estimate, as they only cover the holdings of the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), the public 
pension fund.
29 In Tanzania, an estimated 0.07 percent ($0.41 million) of national pension system assets 
was invested in local infrastructure to fund a feasibility study for construction of the Kigamboni Bridge. 
Institutional investors in some of the other focus countries may have been investing a portion of their 
assets in infrastructure development, through their holdings of government securities and other financial 
instruments, but existing data compiled by the funds and their regulators makes it impossible to quantify 
this. For six countries—Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria and 
Zambia (all but two of which, Nigeria and Zambia, are largely defined benefit systems)—national 
authorities or local market analysts confirmed that none of the pension system’s assets were invested in 
infrastructure development. 
Only two focus countries, Cape Verde and Mozambique, were able to specifically report investment 
by their insurance sectors in infrastructure assets as of year-end 2006—in the telecoms sector in both 
cases (table 4.2). Cape Verde’s insurance sector held 0.5 percent ($0.09 million) of the sector’s total 
                                                 
29 Moreover, it is unclear as to the actual extent that the EADB bond issues finance infrastructure in Uganda as the 
declared intent of its issues is to provide development finance within the East African Community to projects in 
sectors including agriculture, transport and communication, construction and manufacturing, electricity, water 
supply, and housing.  31 
 
assets in shares issued by the telecoms concern Cabo Verde Telcom. In Mozambique, the insurance sector 
held 1.9 percent ($3.9 million) of its total assets in mobile telecoms company Mozambique Cellular 
(MCEL). Five countries (Ghana, Lesotho, Namibia, Nigeria, and Zambia) were able to confirm that none 
of their insurance sector assets were invested in infrastructure sectors. 
Table 4.2    Allocation of national insurance assets by infrastructure sector 










Country  US$ millions 
Sector and type of funds, 
where known 
Benin  71.9 —   
Burkina Faso  53.0  —   
Cameroon 252.4  —   
Cape Verde  18.9  0.1  Telecoms equities 
Chad   9.9 —   
Congo, Dem. Rep.  18.8 —   
Côte d’Ivoire  491.2 —   
Ethiopia 171.9  —   
Ghana  96.9 0   
Kenya  1,308.7 —   
Lesotho 250.5  0   
Madagascar  89.7 —   
Malawi 221.6  —   
Mozambique 198.4  3.9  Telecoms  bonds 
Namibia  2,240.0 0   
Niger 22.7  —    
Nigeria  1,575.2 0   
Rwanda  27.7 —   
Senegal 149.9  —   
South Africa  173,913.0 —   
Sudan 96.1  —   
Tanzania  123.5 —   
Uganda  70.4 —   
Zambia  121.1 0   
Chile /a  25,542.6 4263   
Malaysia  30,715.9 —   32 
 
Sources: Insurance sector assets data sourced from national financial authorities; CEMA (for WAEMU countries and Cameroon); Axco country 
reports; EIU 2006a (for South Africa).  
Note: Total insurance sector assets are underestimated for some countries because national authorities do not compile timely data covering all 
companies (in some cases due to inadequate regulation of the sector). Data breakdown not available for Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Malaysia. 
a. Chilean authorities were unable to specify the insurance sector’s asset allocation specifically in infrastructure sectors but given that corporate 
bonds issued for financing infrastructure development as a share of total is 48 percent and domestically issued equity issued by firms in 
infrastructure sectors accounts for 27 percent of total market cap, one can roughly estimate that up to $4 billion of pension fund asset holdings 
were in corporate bonds issued by companies/projects in infrastructure sectors; and around $263 million can be estimated as holdings in 
domestically issued equity issued by infrastructure companies/projects. 
— = Not available. 
 
The portfolio breakdown of pension system assets varies among the focus countries, although certain 
patterns are discernable based on level of financial sector development and the extent to which state-run 
fund(s) predominate (table 4.3). In a number of countries, investment practices of pension funds and 
insurance companies continue to favor largely short-term government securities, bank deposits, and real 
estate, largely due to a lack of investment alternatives. In a number of countries with underdeveloped 
financial sectors, asset allocation of pension system assets is characterized by heavy investment of assets 
in real estate and other large illiquid assets. This varies considerably among the pension systems for 
which data are available, from no holdings in real estate assets by Namibia’s pension system to 26 percent 
of the total investment by Zambia’s pension scheme.  
Table 4.3  Allocation of national pension system assets by investment vehicle 















































































































































































































































































































































Cape Verde  170     7  76  2     0.7  11  3  0.5       
Ethiopia  —     35  65                         
Ghana  1,077      36  0.2 0      22 0  30  11 1     
Kenya  1,770     3  42     4        24  6  21    
Madagascar 62     0  90 0     0 0 4 6  0.4     
Malawi  —        20        11     48  21       
Namibia  3,312     11  16  Unsp.  0.1  2     58  0       
Niger   79     8           92                
Nigeria  3,508     5  27     0.3        33  7  21  6 
South Africa  80,202     6  12        0     33  1  48    
Tanzania  578  0.1 11 24      7 16     17 23  2     
Uganda  471     26  48  1.8     0  Unsp.  5  17  3    
Zambia  314     8  9              24  26  32    
Chile  88,293     17  13     8        17  0  9  32 
Malaysia  69,659        38              19  0.6  43    33 
 
Sources: Pension system asset data sourced from national pension funds and financial authorities; Axco country reports. 
Note: Total pension assets are underestimated for several countries because national authorities do not compile data covering all funds (in 
some cases due to inadequate regulation of the sector). Pension funds assets data are for 2006 with the exception of Cape Verde, Niger, 
Nigeria, Tanzania (for NSSF), Uganda, Zambia, and comparator country Chile (2007); Rwanda and Madagascar (2005); Benin, Namibia, and 
South Africa (2004); Ethiopia (FY 2002-03). For Niger, $92 million in loans are loans to government. For Tanzania, direct investment in 
infrastructure projects took the form of the financing of a feasibility study for construction of the Kigamboni Bridge. 
— = Not available; Unsp. = Unspecified 
 
In some cases where time-series data are available, however, national pension systems have most 
recently been investing a smaller portion of their assets in real estate. In Tanzania, for example, 20 
percent of the total investment portfolio of Tanzania’s Parastatal Pensions Fund (PPF) pension scheme, 
one of the larger state-run pension schemes, was invested in real estate as of year-end 2006, down from 
40 percent a few years ago.
30 Tanzania’s largest state-owned insurance company, National Insurance 
Corporation (NIC), remained heavily invested in commercial and other real estate, according to the latest 
available data, however, at 42 percent of total assets. NIC was in the process of being privatized and 
restructured as of mid-2007, prompted by its inability to pay its claims on time, largely because of its lack 
of liquidity associated with its investment in real estate and other large illiquid assets.
31 
In the absence of investment alternatives, a sizeable portion of pension system assets have been 
directed to government securities, which are mostly short-term in many countries (table 4.3). In five of 
the 12 focus countries for which specific data on portfolio investment allocation of pension system assets 
are available as of end-July 2007 (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Cape Verde, and Madagascar), investment in 
government securities accounted for more than 40 percent of total assets. Although specific data were not 
compiled/available for pension systems in Chad, Mozambique, and Rwanda, then-current investment 
practices were known to direct funds largely to short-term government securities and bank time 
deposits.
32 Madagascar’s public pension schemes, deemed “fiscally unsustainable” by a 2006 World 
Bank–IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program, held just over 90 percent of total assets in short-term 
government securities as of 2005 (IMF 2006e). In Niger, 92 percent of the assets of the Caisse Nationale 
de Securité Sociale (CNSS) were in the form of claims on Niger’s treasury, and discussions were 
underway as of September 2007 to decide whether the treasury would repay this amount gradually or 
issue a bond to the CNSS repayable over a 10-year period.
33 
Deposits at commercial banks are another popular investment vehicle for pension system assets, 
according to the most recently available asset allocation data. Bank deposits as a proportion of total asset 
holdings exceeded 25 percent in three countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, and Uganda. For Ghana, 36 percent of 
state pension system assets were held as cash and deposits. In a fourth country, Cameroon, data estimates 
as of 2004 indicated pension investment holdings of nearly 61 percent in cash or bank deposits.
34 
Considering the short-term tenors of bank time deposits, specifically reported at a maximum of one year 
                                                 
30 In Tanzania, the two main state-run pension funds, National Social Security Fund (NSSF) and Parastatal Pensions 
Fund (PPF), had been criticized in the past for their overinvestment in commercial and other real estate. 
31 Government plans to privatize NIC have stalled and further delays have occurred most recently due to significant 
changes in the value of the company’s assets since the onset of the tendering process. 
32 Axco reports for Chad and Mozambique; IMF (2005) for Rwanda. 
33 IMF staff (mission for Fourth Review under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, PRGF). 
34 Axco report for Cameroon. 34 
 
in the case of at least five of these countries (table 2.3, chapter 2), these are not the investment vehicles 
best suited to pension funds and other institutional investors that tend to adopt longer-term investment 
horizons that seek to maximize returns, particularly when portfolios are heavily weighted in these 
investment vehicles. They can, however, play a role in a balanced portfolio. 
A relatively low portion of pension fund assets were held in corporate bonds, while holdings in 
equities range widely by country. For the six countries (Cape Verde, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, Tanzania, 
and Uganda) reporting some portion of pension system assets invested in corporate bonds, the allocation 
ranges from only 0.1 to 7.3 percent at a maximum. Investment of pension system assets in equity ranged 
widely among the 11 countries reporting these securities in their asset portfolios, from 4 percent 
(Madagascar) to a high of 58 percent (Namibia). For Namibia, a significant amount of these equities are 
known to have been issued abroad, mostly by firms in South Africa, given Common Monetary Area links. 
For those focus countries for which time-series data on pension system asset allocation are available 
(Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, South Africa, and Zambia), there are signs of a somewhat more diversified 
portfolio approach to asset allocation and a shift away from large holdings in assets generating little or no 
returns, although not consistently (figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4). In three of these five countries (all except 
Madagascar and South Africa), the percentage allocation of pension system assets to equities and other 
non-government-issued securities has increased over the past several years. In South Africa’s case, the 
percentage allocation of these assets to equity securities declined over the period, but the amount was still 
large at 23 percent. In three of the five countries (Ghana, Madagascar, and South Africa), the portion of 
pension system asset holdings in real estate declined, by more than 15 percentage points, in the case of 
Ghana and Madagascar. In South Africa, the allocation declined further from already low levels.  
Figure 4.2  Pension system assets invested in equities: Signs of a more diversified portfolio approach 














Sources: Pension-system asset data sourced from national pension funds and financial authorities. 
* End-2006 or most recent available; end-2005 for Madagascar and South Africa; end-2007 for Zambia. 
 
Patterns in pension system asset allocation varied among the five countries for which these time-
series data are available, reflecting different levels of capital markets development, among other factors. 
In Zambia, the share of pension system assets invested in equities increased from 8 percent in 2001 to 24 35 
 
percent by 2007, as the share of assets invested in fixed cash deposits declined over the period from 12 
percent to 7 percent. Zambia’s pension system asset allocation in real estate decreased overall over the 
2001–07 period, from 28 percent to 26 percent, although there was an increase of two percentage points 
(up from 24 percent) from 2005–07.  
In Kenya’s pension system, there has also been a greater emphasis on holdings of equities over the 
2001–06 time series for which asset allocation data are available, with the investment allocation 
increasing from 9 percent to 24 percent. At the same time, holdings of government securities declined 
somewhat over the period from 50 percent to 42 percent. The share of the Kenyan pension system’s assets 
invested in real estate remained within the 6–8 percent range over the 2001–06 period.  
In Ghana, available time-series data for SSNIT indicate a shift of assets away from real estate over 
the 2000-06 period, with holdings reported as 11 percent in mid-2006, down from 31 percent in 2000 and 
25 percent in 2001. Most of the remaining holdings in real estate projects as of mid-2006 (8 percent of 
SSNIT’s total asset allocation) were projects under construction, which do not generate cash flow. 
SSNIT’s holdings of cash and deposits also increased significantly over the period 2000–06, from 7 
percent to 36 percent and total asset holdings in the form of corporate and student loans, although down 
by five percentage points, to 20 percent at mid-2006, still represented a significant share of the total 
portfolio invested in assets typically generating weak returns. SSNIT further increased its total asset 
holdings in equities, from 21 percent in 2001 to 30 percent by mid-2006.  
In Madagascar, pension system assets held in real estate also declined over the 2000–05 time series, 
from 21 percent in 2000, to 16 percent in 2001, to 6 percent by 2005. But because alternative investment 
vehicles were severely limited, total pension system assets invested in nongovernment-issued securities 
remained low at just under 4 percent while asset holdings in government securities increased over the 
period, from 73 percent in 2000, to 80 percent in 2001, to 90 percent as of 2005. Pension fund asset 
allocation patterns for South Africa reflected that country’s better-developed capital markets. Asset 
holdings in cash/deposits and government securities stayed around 6–7 percent and 9–12 percent, 
respectively, and holdings in real estate fell further, from 4 percent to just under 1 percent.  36 
 
Figure 4.3  Pension-system assets invested in real estate: Signs of a more diversified portfolio approach 













Sources: Pension-system asset data sourced from national pension funds and financial authorities. 
* End-2006 or most recent available; end-2005 for Madagascar and South Africa; end-2007 for Zambia. 
 
There is no comprehensive data set on the investment allocation practices of national insurance 
sectors in the focus countries, especially for investments in infrastructure services. Even in South Africa’s 
relatively well-developed insurance sector (where the FSB has compiled and publicly released the most 
recently available data for the one-year period ending 2005), it is clear that insurance companies did not 
serve as major sources of financing for new projects. South African insurers strongly preferred 
investments in securities issued by blue-chip corporates (which received most of the sector’s 51 percent 
of total assets invested in equities) and real estate investments (the destination of $6.96 billion, or 4 
percent of total assets). This is despite the high income from life insurance premiums in South Africa’s 
sector, which is ranked among the highest worldwide, at 12.4 percent of GDP in 2005 (EIU 2006a). 
According to the most recently compiled data, several insurance sectors in the focus countries placed 
significant amounts of their assets in real estate. For two countries (Tanzania and Mozambique), the 
percentage of total assets held in real estate exceeded 40 percent. For a further seven countries—
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, and Senegal—the percentage exceeded 20 
percent. Among the few countries for which a quantitative breakdown of insurance sector asset allocation 
was not available, such as Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, industry sector analysts 
reported from available market information that real estate constituted a major investment vehicle for 
assets held by these national sectors.
35 DRC life insurer SNAV, for example, reported that it invested its 
assets in real estate and bank deposits. In Chad, real estate, government bonds issued within the region, 
and bank deposits are the popular options, but there are limited government securities vehicles available, 
particularly taking into account demand from insurers elsewhere in the region.  
                                                 
35 Axco country reports. 37 
 
Figure 4.4  Pension-system assets invested in government securities: Signs of a more diversified portfolio approach 

















Sources: Pension system asset data sourced from national pension funds and financial authorities. 
* End-2006 or most recent available; end-2005 for Madagascar and South Africa; end-2007 for Zambia. 
 
Two countries’ insurance sectors reported sizeable investment allocations in government securities 
(Kenya, 45 percent, and Uganda, 65 percent), but insurance sectors overall held a relatively smaller 
proportion in government securities than their counterpart pension systems. In addition to Kenya and 
Uganda, Madagascar had holdings in government securities exceeding 20 percent. Tanzania’s insurance 
sector reported that a combined 33 percent of assets were held in a combined category of “bank deposits 
and government securities.” 
Bank deposits and cash constitute a large proportion of insurers’ asset holdings in several countries: 
the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries, where these holdings range from 
29 to 47 percent, and Sudan, where 71 percent of total sector assets were held in deposits, according to the 
most recently available data
36). Although data are not available, in Chad, bank deposits reportedly 
constitute a “sizeable portion” of insurers’ investment portfolios. Nevertheless, bank deposits and cash 
make up a lower portion of holdings by insurance sectors than corresponding national pension systems in 
some countries: Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zambia.  
Somewhat surprisingly, those national insurance sectors with relatively higher holdings in non- or 
low-yielding investment vehicles such as cash/bank deposits and government securities do not in all cases 
accord a smaller role to the private sector in the provision of insurance services. For example, the five 
WAEMU countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, and Senegal—which overall have 
insurance sectors with a small or no role for the state, nevertheless hold large amounts in cash and 
deposits (see above). This could reflect the severely underdeveloped financial markets and lack of 
suitable investment vehicles, rather than a lack of appropriate emphasis on maximizing investment 
returns.  
Institutional investors across the focus countries keep the vast majority, if not all, of their assets in 
domestic assets, with a few exceptions, although some countries are lowering ceilings on offshore 
                                                 
36 The most recently available data for Sudan’s insurance sector asset allocation are only current as of 2003, however 
(World Bank, FSAP database). 38 
 
investment of assets. In South Africa, there were regulatory reforms under consideration as of mid-2007 
that would increase the 15 percent ceiling on pension funds permitted to be invested overseas to 25 or 30 
percent, along with a broader set of reforms that would strengthen supervision and regulatory oversight of 
the sector. Pension funds in Zambia may invest up to 30 percent of their assets abroad under a 2000 
regulatory amendment. In Namibia, institutional investors invest extensively in overseas assets—mostly 
assets in South Africa, given Common Monetary Area links (IMF 2007c).
37 There is a ceiling of 15 
percent (slated to be raised to 20 percent) on total assets invested outside of the Common Monetary Area 
in southern Africa. Although pension funds and insurance companies in Namibia are expected to comply 
with the minimum local investment requirement of 35 percent of assets, in practice only 15 percent of 
pension fund and insurance sector assets are invested in domestic assets since investment of assets in 
shares of foreign companies listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSX) can count toward the minimum 
local investment requirement (World Bank, FSAP database). Proposed legislative reforms in Namibia 
would compel pension fund managers to report their international investments in more detail.  
In Nigeria, pension fund managers had until recently been prohibited by foreign-exchange regulations 
from investing their assets abroad. As of August 2007, 6 percent of total pension fund assets were held in 
foreign-issued money market securities. Nigeria’s Pencom (2006) intended to determine with the 
country’s pension fund administrators guidelines for investing pension fund assets abroad. In many 
African focus countries, managers of insurance and pension funds are deterred from placing some part of 
their assets abroad due to poor incentives in many of these systems to search for good investment 
opportunities and concerns about currency mismatch due to obligations denominated in domestic 
currency and a lack of hedging instruments in most of these markets. Actual data are not available for 
Mozambique, but given the tiny size of local equity markets (one stock listing), market observers indicate 
that a sizeable amount of pension system assets are thought to be invested overseas, in South African and 
other equity markets.
38 In comparator country Malaysia, as a way for the compulsory pension scheme for 
private sector employees to diversify its investments, pension funds were first allowed in 2005 to invest in 
offshore listed equities through designated international fund managers. 
Well-regulated institutional investors could be reliable sources of longer-term financing for 
infrastructure development, but regulatory and supervisory frameworks are inadequate or nonexistent in 
some of these countries. Investment practices suffer from excessively restrictive regulations governing 
pension fund investments and place too much emphasis on stability and uniform portfolio performance 
without regard for return. Many of these overly restrictive pension fund regulatory regimes discourage or 
render it impossible for pension funds to invest in infrastructure assets. In some other countries, state-run 
institutional investors still enjoy special exemptions from regulations governing the activities of these 
financial intermediaries.
39 The effective functioning of supervisory oversight is also complicated by 
                                                 
37 There is a ceiling of 15 percent (slated to be raised to 20 percent) on total assets invested outside of the Common 
Monetary Area in southern Africa. 
38 Axco report, downloaded Aug. 2007. 
39 For example, in Tanzania a comprehensive system for regulating and supervising insurance companies was 
implemented in 1998; the state insurer NIC continued to enjoy special exemptions because its policies are backed by 
the government (FSSA, May 2003 FSAP mission). Regulations governing the investment activities of the two state-
run pension funds, NSSF and PPF, impose few restrictions other than a prohibition on their investment in assets 
outside Tanzania. Investment policies are largely determined by the respective boards of the two funds (Tanzania 39 
 
systems whereby different pension fund managers report to different regulatory authorities.
40 In several 
countries (Mozambique) where a regulatory framework for state-run funds exists, privately run pension 
systems remain unsupervised. In some countries (Mozambique and Nigeria), there have been reported 
practices of employers deducting social security contributions from workers’ wages and not forwarding 
these contributions to the respective pension scheme.
41 In Cape Verde, the Ministry of Labor and the 
Ministry of Finance are jointly responsible for regulating the pension system, but there are no guidelines 
or regulatory restrictions governing pension fund investments.
42 Other countries, such as Chad, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, and Rwanda, completely lack a regulatory framework and provide no investment guidelines 
for asset allocation.  
Nevertheless, a number of countries are currently undergoing, have recently restructured or instituted, 
or plan in the near term to restructure the regulatory framework governing the activities of pension 
systems and insurance companies. The Ugandan government plans to overhaul the legal and regulatory 
framework for pension and insurance companies to ensure that pensions and other long-term savings 
managed by these financial institutions are more prudently managed (IMF 2007e). As part of the 
restructuring, begun in 2005, of Mozambique’s National Social Security Institute (INSS), the government 
plans to enhance pensions’ regulatory and supervisory frameworks (IMF 2007f). Under a law passed in 
December 2006, measures were implemented to stop the hitherto common practice of employers 
deducting social security contributions from workers’ wages and not forwarding these contributions to the 
INSS (Agencia de informacao de Mocambique, December 11, 2006). The government is also planning to 
strengthen the regulatory capacity of Mozambique’s insurance sector regulator, Inspeccao geral de 
Seguros (IGS), by establishing a new supervisory body not under the statutory supervision of the Bank of 
Uganda, for the purpose of regulating pension funds, insurance companies and other nonbank financial 
institutions.  
Many focus countries’ national pension systems are planning reforms that would promote and 
develop privately managed pension funds as a complementary tier to a state-sponsored system that has 
been providing inadequate pension benefits. In contrast, South Africa’s pension system is on the verge of 
undergoing a process of consolidation as part of a broader reform of the national system. More than 
13,600 funds are likely to be reduced to a few hundred large funds. National financial sector authorities 
are encouraging mergers and consolidation in insurance sectors in several countries (South Africa, Kenya, 
Namibia, Nigeria, and Uganda). Following a significant increase in capital requirements for insurance 
companies in Nigeria, effective from February 2007, the tally of registered insurers had fallen to 71 by 
                                                                                                                                                             
FSSA, following May 2003 FSAP mission). There were cases several years ago in which some of Tanzania’s 6 
pension funds were making unsecured loans to senior politicians and political parties. 
40 In Tanzania, the six funds report to different regulatory authorities. As of 2005, PSPF, PPF, GEPF, and ZSSF 
were supervised by MoF, LAPF was supervised by the Ministry of Local Government, and the NSSF by the 
Ministry of Labor. 
41 New legislation has recently been put in place in both Mozambique and Nigeria seeking to stop this practice. 
42 Finance director of the National Social Welfare Institute, Cape Verde. 40 
 





                                                 
43 As of August 2007, according to Axco reports, no insurance company operating in Nigeria had yet met the new 
capital adequacy requirements imposed by the National Insurance Commission (NAICOM).  41 
 
5    Domestic capital markets  
Capital markets are a natural source of infrastructure finance in developed country markets and an 
increasing number of developing country markets, providing longer-term finance than bank lending does. 
Typically, an infrastructure finance transaction begins with a bank loan with medium-term maturity 
during the project’s construction period, followed by refinancing in capital markets at longer maturity 
terms once the project has begun to generate revenues that can support debt finance repayment. In this 
section, we assess the depth of domestic capital markets in the focus countries with regard to their actual 
and potential role in financing local infrastructure projects.  
Government bonds 
Looking at the size of government bond markets in the focus countries (table 5.1), South Africa’s 
government bond market is significantly larger in absolute terms than the other focus countries and larger 
than all others but Cape Verde’s market as a percentage of GDP (at 25 percent and 29 percent of GDP, 
respectively). The size of bond markets relative to GDP is known to be much smaller in developing 
countries, which tend to have shallower, underdeveloped financial markets. To put this in larger 
perspective, the bond market in the United States was about twice the size of the economy in 2006, while 
in emerging East Asia, it was roughly half the combined size of these economies.
44 For 9 of the 15 
countries that had government bonds outstanding at the end of 2006 and released these data, bonds 
outstanding as a percentage of GDP was less than 5 percent.  
For the most part, government bond issuance has been too small in both issue amount and frequency 
to crowd out corporate borrowers, which have been deterred by illiquid secondary markets and other 
impediments, as discussed in the next section. Where corporate sector borrowing has been crowded out, it 
has been the result of too much government borrowing through short-term debt securities (treasury bills) 
purchased by local banks, which prefer such high-yielding, short-term investment instruments to riskier 
lending to private-sector borrowers. 
Except in South Africa, the markets for government bonds tend to be illiquid and shallow. The 
illiquidity that characterizes these bond markets—particularly secondary market illiquidity—often means 
that, where investors do buy government securities, they tend to prefer shorter maturities and avoid the 
longer maturities. Investors tend to buy and hold. The major investors are local commercial banks, 
although local institutional investors and foreign portfolio investors have been gaining ground in recent 
years—in Kenya and Zambia, for example (see chapter 4).  
                                                 
44 Goldstein and Turner (2004), however, further point out that developing country bond markets vary considerably 
in liquidity and ability to hedge risk, for a given size.  42 
 
Table 5.1 Bond markets in the African focus countries at end-2006 
Country 
Amount of total 
outstanding 
government bonds 
as % GDP 
Maximum term of 
government bonds 
(years) /a 
Amount of total 
outstanding 





providers as % total 
outstanding 




Benin  0 5  1.1  94 7 
Burkina  Faso  0 4  0.7  100 6 
Cape  Verde  29  14  0 n.a. n.a. 
Côte  d’Ivoire  2 3 0  n.a.  n.a. 
Ghana  8  5 0.5 0.0  5 
Kenya  14 15  0.5 51  7 
Lesotho  /c  n.a.  10 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Madagascar  n.a.  1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Malawi  1  25 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Mozambique  2 10  0.3 55 10 
Namibia  11 20  7.1 65 10 
Nigeria  4  28  0.1 0 8 
Senegal  1 5  0.8  93.5 7 
South  Africa  25  30 13.3 20.2  27 
Sudan  —  6 — — — 
Tanzania  4 10  0.4  0 10 
Uganda  6 10  0.3 58 10 
Zambia    4  5  0.2 43 12 
Sources: Bond data are sourced from national and regional securities exchanges and from national regulatory authorities. 
Note: No data were available for Cameroon. Organized bond markets did not exist in Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, 
Niger, or Rwanda as of this table’s reference date.  
a. For issues outstanding at end-2006, except in the case of Benin. In Benin, no issues were outstanding, but the government issued a five-
year bond traded on the Bourse régionale des valeurs mobilières (BRVM) in 2000. The maximum maturity terms for government bond issues in 
Kenya in 2006 was 12 years; in March 2007, the Kenyan government issued and listed its first 15-year bond on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. In 
Malawi, two special issues of 25-year government securities appeared in June 1983; otherwise, the longest term for outstanding government 
securities was 13 years. 
b. For countries listing bonds on the BRVM (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal), the applicable date for outstanding bond amounts is 
April 30, 2007. 
c. There is no government bond market per se in Lesotho, but in the late 1990s, the Lesotho government made 5- and 10-year issues of 
special purpose bonds to finance the restructuring of the Lesotho Bank; the 10-year issue remains outstanding and matures in 2009. The 
Central Bank of Lesotho was unable to release data/further information on the outstanding bond issues for confidentiality reasons (CBL 2006). 
— = Not available; n.a. = Not applicable. 
 
Again with the exception of South Africa, trading activity of government bonds in 2006 was much 
lower than in other developing country markets, although some markets, such as Kenya’s, saw a 
considerable boost in trading activity over the period.
45 The 2,495 percent turnover ratio
46 of South 
                                                 
45 In Kenya, total annual bond turnover (government and corporate issues) increased by 257 percent in 2006 over the 
prior year, according to data reported by the Nairobi Stock Exchange. According to the NSE, the current system 
does not provide separate information for corporate bond turnover and Government of Kenya Treasury bond 
turnover; the relatively small amount of corporate bonds listed on the NSE rarely trade and are held to maturity. 
46 Turnover ratio refers to the ratio of the annual trading volume of government bonds in 2006 to total outstanding 
government bonds as of year-end. 43 
 
African government bonds stands in marked contrast to turnover ratios of 0.3 percent for Nigeria, nil for 
Cape Verde, and less than 10 percent for Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia.  
Except in a few countries (Cape Verde, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zambia)—and with the 
exception of some ad hoc issues (by Ethiopia, Lesotho and Malawi)—the focus countries have issued 
securities with tenors of more than one year only in the past 10 years.
47 Moreover, issues are infrequent. 
Even in South Africa, the government issued bonds only periodically “on demand” in the decade 
following the first issues in the late 1970s, and there was no active secondary market and no refined yield 
curve, with the introduction of government benchmark bonds being a relatively recent phenomenon.
48 
Nigeria began issuing bonds in 1961, less than a year after independence, but an 18-year period of 
nonissuance ended in 2003, when the federal government declared its intention to retire short-term 
government securities and to finance budget deficits with limited recourse to medium-term debt securities 
(Federal Government of Nigeria bonds). These longer-tenor issues are also intended to provide a 
benchmark yield for issues by the corporate sector. In recent years, governments have been issuing debt 
securities at longer tenors with two goals in mind: first, to lengthen the maturity profile of government 
issues to establish a benchmark yield curve for later corporate and parastatal bond issues as part of an 
overall aim to develop local capital markets and, second, to improve debt management.
49  
A few of the countries that do not yet issue government bonds have indicated their intention to do so 
as part of a plan to develop long-term finance. This will be feasible only if macroeconomic stability can 
                                                 
47 Several “special issues” in Ethiopia, Lesotho, and Malawi are a partial exception to this statement. In the late 
1990s, the Lesotho government made 5- and 10-year issues of special-purpose bonds to finance the restructuring of 
the Lesotho Bank; the 10-year issue remains outstanding and matures in 2009. The Central Bank of Lesotho was 
unable to release data or other information on the outstanding bond issues, for reasons of confidentiality (Treasury 
Operations, CBL). For Malawi, there are two “special issues” of government securities for 25 years, issued in June 
1983; otherwise, the longest maturity term for outstanding government securities is 13 years; in the recent past, the 
Malawi government has not favored issuing bonds, deeming them a less attractive financing instrument than 
treasury bills, owing to uncertainty on the future movement of interest rates on government securities (Reserve Bank 
of Malawi). The Ethiopian government occasionally issues bonds to finance expenditures or absorb excess liquidity 
in the banking system, but the twice-monthly auction of treasury bills is the only regular market for securities 
transactions.  
48 In 1989, the South African government consolidated several smaller issues by reissuing new 5-, 10-, 15- and 20-
year benchmark bonds (South Africa National Treasury, South Africa Case Study on Debt Management, June 2003).  
49 This is illustrated, for example, by the stated aim of domestic debt management under the Nigerian authorities’ 
core economic reform program, to restructure the government’s domestic debt portfolio by issuing more securities at 
longer tenors and to restrict the previous practice of monetizing fiscal deficits. This stands in contrast to a case such 
as Botswana (mentioned here for comparator purposes, although not covered in the cross-country Diagnostic 
analysis), in which the government has also been issuing debt securities at longer tenors, although raising financing 
has not been an aim in issuing local currency government debt securities, given a track record of overall budget 
surpluses over much of the past two decades. In this latter case, rather, local capital markets development has been 
the primary stated reason for issuance of government debt securities. 44 
 
be achieved.
50 Some countries already issuing government bonds plan to further lengthen maturity 
profiles.
51 
The maximum maturity of government bonds outstanding at the end of 2006 varied widely from 
country to country (table 5.1). In five countries (Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Niger, 
and Rwanda), only short-term government securities of less than one-year had been issued.
52 In South 
Africa, government bond maturities ran as high as 30 years, but only three other focus countries had 
government bonds outstanding with a maturity longer than 10 years (Cape Verde, 14 years; Kenya, 15 
years; and Namibia, 20 years).
53 A further five countries had government bonds outstanding with a 
maturity of more than 5 years (10 years maximum for Tanzania, Uganda, Lesotho,
54 and Mozambique; 
and 6 years for the Sudan).
55 
In the past, the Nigerian government issued bonds with maturity terms as long as 28 years, but no 
such bonds have been outstanding since 1996. In recent years, the maximum maturity of bonds issued by 
the Nigerian government has been seven years. Because the longer issues (5–10 years) of the Federal 
Government of Nigeria’s first series in 2003 (following an 18-year period of nonissuance) were greatly 
undersubscribed, subsequent issues under the government’s second series of bonds, in 2005, had shorter 
terms (2–5 years). In 2006, however, a third series of three-, five-, and seven-year bonds was 
oversubscribed. 
Government bond issues specifically designated for infrastructure are rare in the focus countries 
(table 5.2). Nigeria and Senegal were the only focus countries in which outstanding government bonds 
had been issued specifically to finance infrastructure development. Each country had issued one such 
bond as of end-2006. In Côte d’Ivoire, two government bonds have been issued “to finance the 
government budget, energy, and the agricultural sector,” although the extent to which this financing has 
gone toward infrastructure development is unclear.  
The Senegalese government had $93.3 million outstanding, as of April 2007, on a five-year bond 
issued in 2005 to finance road and rail transport infrastructure and traded on the regional stock exchange, 
the Bourse régionale des valeurs mobilières (BRVM). In 2004, Nigeria’s Akwa Ibom state issued a three-
year bond for 6 billion naira (approximately $46.8 million at the exchange rate prevailing at the end of 
                                                 
50 The Rwandan government introduced its first treasury bond issues in early 2008, as part of an overall aim to 
develop local capital markets and raise long-term funds for development. Madagascar’s government may consider 
lengthening the maturity profile of its treasury security issues if sustained macroeconomic stability is achieved 
(IMF, Rwanda: FSSA (Country Report No. 06/305), August 2006). 
51 The Bank of Zambia had been authorized by the government under the Financial Sector Development Plan to 
further extend the maturity profile (by issuing 7-, 10- and 15-year bonds) and began issuing bonds with such longer 
maturities in August 2007 (Bank of Zambia).  
52 Rwanda’s government has since issued three treasury bonds (in the first quarter of 2008). 
53 Although the Malawian government has made special issues of bonds with maturity terms as long as 25 years, in 
the recent past, the Malawi government has not favored issuing bonds, deeming them a less attractive financing 
instrument than Treasury bills due to uncertainty on the future movement of interest rates on government securities. 
54 The Lesotho government does not issue “regularly traded bonds,” however, and the single 10-year bond issue 
outstanding was one of two special purpose bonds issued in 1999 to finance the restructuring of the Lesotho Bank. 
55 As of mid-2006 (reference date for Ghana’s total amount of government bonds) the longest maturity terms for 
outstanding government bonds in Ghana were five years. In September 2007, however, Ghana issued a 10-year 
Eurobond, becoming the first HIPC beneficiary country to tap international private capital markets. 45 
 
2006)to finance “infrastructure development.” Since 1986, four different Nigerian states have made five 
issues, ranging from 15 million to 5 billion naira, to finance a variety of infrastructure development 
projects including water and drainage improvement, urban and rural road construction, and rural 
electricity. But none of the federal government’s bonds, which make up 95.6 percent of all Nigerian 
government bonds outstanding, had infrastructure development as their designated purpose. 
Consequently, the percentage of total government bonds outstanding that were issued specifically to 
finance infrastructure was very small: 0.93 percent.  
Table 5.2  Local government bond markets and infrastructure financing as of end-2006 
Country 
Amount of total 
outstanding 
government 




issued to finance 
infrastructure as % of 
total government 
bonds outstanding 
Maximum term of 
government bond (in 
years) /1 
Benin  0 0 5 
Burkina  Faso  0 0 4 
Cape Verde  29.2  —  14 
Côte  d’Ivoire 2.1 0 3 
Ghana 8.3  0  10 
Kenya 14.4  0  15 
Lesotho   n.a.  0  10 
Madagascar n.a.  n.a. 1 
Malawi 1.2  0  25 
Mozambique 2.1 0  10 
Namibia 11.2  0  20 
Nigeria 4.2  0.93 28 
Senegal 1.1  100 5 
South Africa  24.7  1.2 30 
Tanzania 3.9  0  10 
Uganda 5.7  0  10 
Zambia 4.0  n.a.  5 
Sources: Data on outstanding government bonds were obtained from national authorities, except for Ghana (Standard Chartered Ghana). 
Note: No data were available for Cameroon and Sudan. Organized bond markets do not exist in Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Ethiopia, Niger, or Rwanda.  
a. For Kenya and for countries listing bonds on the Bourse régionale des valeurs mobilières—Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and 
Senegal—the applicable date for outstanding bond amounts is April 30, 2007. 
— = Not available; n.a. = Not applicable.  
 
An estimated 1.2 percent of all South African government bonds outstanding were specifically issued 
to finance infrastructure. St South African Reserve Bank (SARB) staff estimated that all municipal bonds 
outstanding at end-2006 (valued at just over $760 million) were for infrastructure.  
The actual share of government bond financing used for infrastructure development in Nigeria, South 
Africa, and other focus countries may be higher than shown in table 5.2, because some of the financing 
raised through government bond issues may have been applied to infrastructure development. This is 
difficult to gauge, however, because of the difficulty of differentiating within the government bond 46 
 
financing raised, the amount that was directly allocated to specific projects. Most national finance 
ministries, central banks, and stock exchanges were unable to provide even rough estimates of these 
amounts. According to the Bank of Zambia, for example, it is difficult to determine how much of the 
financing raised from government bond issues has been used for financing infrastructure, because 
financial provisions for these sorts of projects are normally made out of the government’s annual capital 
expenditure budgets, and funds raised through securities issues are used to finance an overall deficit rather 
than a particular component of government spending. 
In September 2007, Ghana became the second of the focus countries, after South Africa, to issue a 
sovereign bond on international capital markets. The first beneficiary of the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries initiative to tap international private capital markets, Ghana listed its 10-year, $750 million 
Eurobond on the London Stock Exchange to raise financing for infrastructure projects, including road 
construction and energy resources. Another stated intention of the issue was to provide a benchmark for 
future bond issues by corporate entities.
56 With demand reaching $3 billion, the landmark dollar-
denominated issue was heavily oversubscribed. Some 40 percent was placed with U.S. investors, 36 
percent with U.K. investors, and the remainder with investors in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. 
Kenya, Zambia, and Nigeria had publicly stated their intention to issue sovereign bonds on international 
capital markets in the near future, although these plans have apparently been postponed given the mcuh 
tighter liquidity conditions in global capital markets in 2008 (appendix 1). 
Comparator country Chile placed its first issue of a $500 million sovereign bond in the U.S. market in 
1999 with the aim of providing a benchmark for private bond issuance in international markets. Five 
additional sovereign issues including a Eurobond have followed: the total amount outstanding for the four 
unexpired bonds as of September 2007 was $2.85 billion, according to the central bank. 
According to the Chilean Central Bank Financial Operations Division, Chile has not issued a 
government bond specifically to finance infrastructure.
57 As in the focus countries, the share of 
government bond financing devoted to infrastructure development is difficult to determine, given that 
some of the overall financing raised via government bond issues may have been allocated toward this 
financing purpose. Outstanding Chilean government bonds as a percentage of GDP have been declining 
since 2000, when a budget surplus target was set (initially at 1 percent of GDP, but adjusted downward to 
0.5 percent in May 2007) (EIU 2007). As of end-2006, outstanding Chilean government bonds amounted 
to just 1.5 percent of GDP, a level below that of most focus countries with government bonds 
outstanding.  
No Chilean government debt is issued with maturity terms of less than two years, according to the 
Central Bank of Chile, and consumer-price-indexed instruments constitute the largest part of domestic 
debt. At the same time, Chile’s turnover ratio
58 of 1,286 percent for government bonds in 2006 is 
                                                 
56 Ghana’s Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning press statement, October 10, 2007. 
57 During the late 1990s, a public-private risk-sharing arrangement evolved in Chile, which involved issuance of 
local-currency-denominated bonds for infrastructure financing of government road construction projects (see 
chapter 2). 
58 Turnover ratio refers to the ratio of annual trading volume of government bonds to the total outstanding 
government bonds as of year-end. 47 
 
dramatically higher than the turnover ratios of below 25 percent for all African focus countries with 
government bond markets, except South Africa. 
Both Chile and Malaysia have corporate bond markets that are becoming more important than their 
corresponding government bond markets, as explored in the next section. 
Corporate bond markets 
In the past decade, governments in the region have extended the maturity profile of their securities 
issues in an effort to establish a benchmark against which corporate bonds can be priced. Except in South 
Africa, however, corporate bond markets remain small and illiquid, where they exist at all. Even in South 
Africa’s relatively developed capital market, the first listing of a corporate bond on an organized 
securities exchange occurred as recently as 1994 (by South African Breweries). As a percentage of GDP, 
outstanding corporate bonds amounted to no more than 1 percent in 13 of the 15 focus countries that had 
a corporate bond market at the end of 2006 (table 5.3). 
At 13 percent of GDP, South Africa’s corporate bond market is by far as the largest among the 
countries, with $33.8 billion in issues outstanding at year-end 2006, followed by Namibia’s at $457 
million (7.1 percent of GDP), where the corporate sector has strong ties with South African companies. In 
South Africa, corporate bond issues have grown at a faster rate than government issues in recent years. 
The country saw 77 new corporate bond issues worth R 161 billion ($23.1 billion) in 2006, up from 57 
issues in 2005 and 4 in 1998. A few landmark issues notable for their size and long maturity illustrate the 
growing depth of this segment of the market. Increased supply of corporate bond issues has been matched 
by an increase in demand: with decreased government bond issuance, South Africa’s investors have been 
seeking alternative investments.  
New issues by the South African banking sector accounted for most of the growth in recent years, 
especially asset-backed commercial paper and other securitizations of banks’ rapidly growing consumer 
and mortgage loan portfolios. But because of the small local investor base in South Africa, the effects of 
saturation had taken hold by early 2007. An increasing number of corporate issuers, particularly South 
African banks and issuers of high-yield bonds, were looking to access the external bond market for the 
first time, as the premium for issuing in the European, United States, and other global financial markets at 
that time had become less onerous (see below).  
Issues by entities in infrastructure sectors constituted just over 20 percent ($6.84 billion) of all 
outstanding corporate bond issues on the Bond Exchange of South Africa as of end-2006 (table 5.4). 
Electricity utility Eskom’s $3.6 billion issue led the way. MTN and Telkom together accounted for $1.9 
billion. Infrastructure development financing needs are expected to continue to drive corporate, parastatal, 
and municipal bond issues in South Africa’s local market, albeit more slowly than in recent years. Bond 
issues by corporate entities elsewhere in the region, beginning with issues in 2006 of $50.2 million (R 350 
million) by Mauritius Commercial Bank and $4.3 million (R 30 million) by Swaziland Post & Telecoms, 
are also expected to give continued impetus to corporate bond market development. 48 
 
Table 5.3    Characteristics of corporate bond markets  
Country 
Tally of corporate 
bonds listed on the 
local securities 
exchange 
Amount of total 
outstanding 
corporate bonds as 
% of GDP 
Annual turnover 
ratio of corporate 




as % total outstanding 
Maximum term of 
corporate bonds 
outstanding (years) 
   end-2006  2006  2006  end-2006 
end-2006 or end-
April 2007 /b 
Benin  3  1.1  2.5  94 7 
Burkina Faso  2  0.7  1.5  100 6 
Côte d’Ivoire  0  0  0  n.a.  n.a. 
Ghana 3  0.5  0.1  0  5 
Kenya /c  8  0.5  —  51 7 
Mozambique  6  0.3  0.9  55 10 
Namibia  9  7.1  19.9  65 10 
Nigeria 3  0.1  0.0  0  8 
Senegal  2  0.8  1.5  93 7 
South Africa  563  13.3  351.1  20  27 
Tanzania 6  0.4  1.1  0  10 
Uganda  3  0.3  0.3  58 10 
Zambia 4  0.2  0  43  12 
Sources: Corporate bonds data are sourced from national stock exchanges and other national sources. 
Note: At the end of 2006, corporate bonds had not been issued in Cape Verde, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, or Rwanda. Cape Verde’s market was launched with a debut issue by electricity generation utility Elektra in mid-
2007. Data are not available for Cameroon or Sudan.  
a. Bond turnover ratio is defined as the ratio of annual trading volume to outstanding corporate bonds at year-end. 
b. For countries listing bonds on the Bourse régionale des valeurs mobilières (BRVM)—Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal—the 
applicable date for outstanding bond amounts is April 30, 2007. Côte d’Ivoire’s transport, storage, and shipping company, Saga CI, had a bond 
issue that traded in 2006. 
c. According to the Nairobi Stock Exchange, the current system does not provide separate information on corporate and government bond 
turnover. For several reasons, including a lack of product diversity and the small size and number of corporate bond issues, most corporate 
bonds are held to maturity and rarely traded. 
— = Not available; n.a. = Not applicable. 
 
Outside South Africa, the few focus countries that had corporate bonds listed on their national or 
regional securities exchange at the end of 2006 had only a handful of such listings, and the amounts 
issued were small. Only three corporate bond issues by two issuers were listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange, prompting the formation of a Bond Market Steering Committee (BMSC) to encourage bond 
market development as a key priority for overall national economic development.
59  
The extent to which corporate bonds finance infrastructure across the countries varies, although there 
seems to be an emerging trend of new issuers operating in infrastructure sectors coming to the market. In 
at least one case, an infrastructure entity made the market’s debut issue.
60 The share of corporate bonds 
outstanding that had been issued to finance infrastructural development exceeded 50 percent in 7 of the 12 
                                                 
59 Between 1990 and 1992, there were 40 corporate bonds issued in the Nigerian bond market. Between 1999 and 
2006, there were only 11 such issues (Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission). 
60 The first corporate bond issued and listed on the Cape Verde stock exchange, in mid-June 1997, was by the 
electrical utility Elektra. It was well received by investors, being six times oversubscribed (Bolsa de Cape Verde). 49 
 
focus countries that had corporate bond issues outstanding as of end-2006 (figure 5.1).
61 In Ghana, 
Nigeria, and Tanzania, none of the corporate bond issues outstanding at that time was by an 
infrastructure-related company. However, such companies were strongly represented on the BRVM, 
where they accounted for 94 percent of the total outstanding issues by companies from Benin (electricity 
generation), 100 percent by corporates from Burkina Faso (telecommunications), and 94 percent from 
Senegal (port operations).
62  
Table 5.4  Corporate bonds outstanding on the Bond Exchange of South Africa 
Nominal value, US$ millions, end-2006 
Total “corporate bond” issues on BESA /a  33,817.2 
of which issues by:    
Banks /b  7,994.2 
of which inward listings:    
Mauritius Commercial Bank  50.2 
Total “corporate bond” issues by entities in infrastructure sectors /c  6,841.3 
of which local listings by:    
Telkom (issued in 1998; 10 years maturity)  662.3 
Telkom (issued in 2005; 15 years maturity)  358.7 
Mobile Telephone Networks (Issued 2006; 4 years)  717.4 
Mobile Telephone Networks (Issued 2006; 8 years)  186.5 
Eskom 3,613.9 
SA National Roads Agency  772.5 
Infrastructure Finance Corp. (CDOs)  525.8 
of which inward listings by:    
Swaziland Post & Telecoms  4.3 
Issues by entities in infrastructure sectors     
as % of total corporate bond issues  20.23 
Source: BESA. 
a. That is, issues not made by the central or municipal government. 
b. Does include inward listing by Mauritius Commercial Bank but does not include listings by state-owned development banks. 
c. Includes inward listing by Swaziland Post & Telecoms. 
 
The infrastructure sectors of the corporations issuing these bonds varied. Several issues were made by 
companies operating in telecommunications, which had the highest number of issues outstanding (five) of 
all infrastructure sectors (table 5.5). Other recent debt issues have been made by companies operating in 
the telecommunications sector in South Africa and Ghana that have tapped international investors. Issues 
by telecommunications providers were listed on exchanges in West Africa (by Burkina Faso’s Celtel and 
Office National des Télécommunications, ONATEL), Kenya (Celtel), Uganda (Uganda Telecom), and 
Mozambique (Telecommunication de Mozambique, TDM; and Mozambique Cellular, MCEL). A single, 
                                                 
61 It should be noted here again, however, that the overall tally of corporate bond issues outstanding tends to be 
small, as do total amounts raised. 
62 In addition, Côte d’Ivoire transport, storage and shipping company, Saga CI, had a bond issue that traded in 2006 
but was redeemed in March 2007. (This issue is not included in total outstanding amount for Côte d’Ivoire because 
the reference date for the outstanding amount of bonds listed on the BRVM is end-April 2007.) 50 
 
exceptionally large listing (Celtel Kenya) accounted for nearly half of total corporate bonds outstanding 
on Kenya’s stock exchange. Excluding South Africa, telecoms accounted for 12 percent ($124.3 million) 
of the total value of bond issues outstanding in all sectors in the focus countries. 
Table 5.5  Outstanding corporate bonds issued by infrastructure providers in the focus countries, excluding South 
Africa 
As of end-2006 except for issues traded on the BRVM (April 2007) 






















RFA10 Loan Stock 2010  Namibia  NSX  transport (roads) construction  2004  6  251  55 
RFA16 Loan Stock 2016  Namibia  NSX  transport (roads) construction  2006  10  47  10 
Port Autonome de Dakar   Senegal  BRVM  port management  2004  7  62  93 
Total transport                 361  34 
Celtel Burkina Faso   Burkina Faso  BRVM  telecoms  2003  6  6  16 
ONATEL Burkina  Faso  BRVM  telecoms  2005  6  33  84 
Celtel Kenya  Kenya  Nairobi SE  telecoms  2005  4  65  51 
Uganda Telecom  Uganda  USE  telecoms  2003  5  7  22 
TDB Mozambique  Maputo  SE  telecoms  2004  6  3  13 
MCEL Mozambique  Maputo  SE  telecoms  2005  5  10  42 
Total telecoms                 124  12 
Comunaute Electrique de Benin   Benin  BRVM  electricity generation   2003  7  33  60 
Comunaute Electrique de Benin  Benin  BRVM  electricity generation   2004  7  19  34 
Lunsemfwa Hydro Power   Zambia  LuSE  electricity generation  2003  7  7  43 
Total electricity generation/power                 59  6 
Shelter-Afrique (Senegal)  Senegal  BRVM 
provides regional housing 
finance & other development 
assistance including for 
infrastructure 
2003 7  4  0.4 
Source: National securities exchanges. 
Note: For individual issues, percent share of all listed issues for the country of domicile; for sector totals, given as a share of all listed corporate 
bond issues in the focus countries except South Africa. BRVM = Bourse régionale des valeurs mobiliéres; SE = stock exchange; LuSE = 
Lusaka Stock Exchange. 
 
Transport infrastructure accounted for just over one-third ($360.6 million) of all corporate issues 
outstanding in these markets (excluding South Africa and Sudan) at end-2006. Two very large issues 
loom large in that total: one of $298.4 million for road construction by Namibia’s Road Fund 
Administration, and another of $62.2 million for transport infrastructure development by Senegal’s Port 
Autonome de Dakar. Bonds listed by corporations in other infrastructure sectors included power 
generation (Communauté Electrique de Benin and Zambia’s Lunsemfwa Hydro Power Company), which 
accounted for 6 percent of all total issues in the focus countries. Bank issues also dominated in several 
countries, constituting 100 percent and 96 percent of the total amount outstanding in the corporate bond 
markets in Ghana and Nigeria at end-2006. Corporate bonds issued by banks made up 35 percent of the 
total amount outstanding in Namibia.  51 
 
Figure 5.1 Corporate bonds issued by infrastructure providers as share of total outstanding 









































































































Sources: Corporate bond data are sourced from national stock exchanges and other national sources. 
Note: For countries listing bonds on the BRVM (Benin, Burkina Faso, Senegal), the applicable date for outstanding bond amounts is April 30, 
2007. The Côte d’Ivoire transport, storage & shipping company, Saga CI, had a bond issue that traded in 2006 but was no longer listed at 
reference date. 
 
Although it may seem that more corporate bonds than government bonds have been issued to finance 
infrastructure, it should be noted that it is far easier to assess the extent to which corporate issues finance 
infrastructure, by identifying the issuer’s industry sector. 
Many companies operating in these markets would like to borrow on longer terms by issuing bonds 
but many of the markets still lack a benchmark for pricing (see above). With medium- to long-term bank 
financing costly and scarce, and macroeconomic conditions stabilizing in a number of the focus countries, 
corporate bond financing is increasingly seen as a viable alternative (Peterside 2006). Further progress is 
needed in many countries, however, in developing a well-established yield curve, maintaining low and 
stable inflation rates and interest rates, improving corporate governance and transparency, developing a 
larger and well-regulated institutional investor base, putting in place credible rating agencies, and 
increasing awareness of prospective issuers and investors. In December 2006, the International Finance 
Corporation issued its first local-currency bond in Sub-Saharan Africa—a five-year, AAA-rated, $44.6 
million bond, denominated in CFA francs and listed on the BRVM. A key purpose of the issue was to set 
an efficient benchmark yield, reinforce credit differentiation, and promote development of the regional 
bond market in the eight WAEMU member countries. Prior to this issue by the IFC, the West African 
Development Bank (BOAD) had been the de facto benchmark issuer on the WAEMU regional bond 
market, even though its bonds did not have a credit rating (IFC 2007).  
Corporate-bond-trading volumes are low or nonexistent on some exchanges. Turnover ratios in these 
markets, where they exist, are even lower than on the government bond markets (see table 5.3). Most 
corporate bonds are held to maturity and not traded because of their small size and number and lack of 
financial product diversity. The corporate bonds listed on the Nigerian and Zambian securities markets 
did not trade at all during 2006, and turnover ratios were less than 3 percent in all of the other focus 
country markets on which corporate bonds were listed. The exceptions were Namibia, where the bond-
turnover ratio was 20 percent, and South Africa, 351 percent. Even South Africa’s corporate bond market 
is shallow compared with those of other emerging and developed-country markets and it has a relatively 52 
 
illiquid secondary market. South African corporate bonds are much less tradable than government issues, 
with investors in corporate bonds more likely to buy and hold. Although the supply of new corporate 
issues in South Africa has been growing rapidly, investor demand remains low, which has driven some 
issuers to go offshore.  
Maturity terms for corporate bonds in the focus countries do not exceed 10 years, except in South 
Africa (where the observed maximum is 27.5 years) and Zambia (12 years). In South Africa in 2006, 
ESKOM, an electricity utility, issued a landmark 27.5-year, R65 billion multi-term note program, 
comprising seven different local currency bonds, with an initial issue of R2.5 billion. But average 
maturity terms in South Africa’s corporate bond market are still only five years. In contrast, corporate 
bonds in Chile had a typical maturity of 16 years during the period from 1991 to 2005; bonds issued by 
firms in the construction, transportation, and utilities sectors (which accounted for the largest amount of 
issuance activity) typically had longer maturities than firms in other sectors (Braun and Briones, 
forthcoming). Average corporate bond maturities for Chilean issuers were nearly three times as long as 
the average in other developing countries over the period.  
With a few exceptions, access to external markets remains restricted, and with the onset of the global 
financial crisis in the fourth quarter of 2008, the ability to tap external markets appeared increasingly 
remote for nearly all of the African focus countries. Given the limitations to the South African domestic 
bond market’s capacity due to still-limited investor appetite, cross-border bond issues increased rapidly 
into early 2007, particularly by banks and high-yield issuers; this has since slowed significantly, however. 
South African cellular-phone operator Cell C went offshore to raise debt financing: in 2005 it issued R 5.1 
billion in high-yield Eurobonds due in 2012 and high-yield dollar bonds due in 2015. For the first time 
since the early 1990s, two Nigerian corporations turned to the international capital markets in early 2007 
and issued Eurobonds. Guaranty Trust Bank raised $350 million through a January 2007 five-year issue 
that yielded 8.625 percent. Rated BB– by Standard & Poor’s, the issue was oversubscribed by $221 
million. It was followed a month later by First Bank’s $175 million subordinate Eurobond, yielding 9.75 
percent and rated B by Standard & Poor’s. Although no Ghanaian corporations have yet issued bonds on 
international capital markets, Ghana’s largest telecoms company, Ghana Telecom, raised $40 million in 
December 2006 through a five-year debt issue, denominated in cedis, of which 53 percent was placed 
with local investors and 47 percent with foreign investors, including pension funds and mutual funds in 
Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In the current external financing environment, it is 
considered unlikely that further such examples of African companies raising debt financing externally 
will follow in the foreseeable future. Chile’s corporate bond market is profiled in box 5.1. 53 
 
Box 5.1   The case of Chile: Corporate bonds issued to finance infrastructure have spurred market 
development 
Chile has a fairly large corporate bond market that has developed rapidly over the past two decades, 
especially when compared with most other emerging market economies. Corporate issues accounted for 38 
percent of total bonds outstanding in Chile, according to the most recently available data.
a  
Issues in the public utilities and transport sectors have been credited with speeding up the development of 
Chile’s corporate bond market (Braun and Briones, forthcoming). These sectors were the sole local issuers 
of corporate bonds until 1998, and they constituted nearly half of all issues on the domestic market and 
more than 40 percent of average amounts raised from 1990 to 2005, according to one estimate. Private 
firms in the construction sector participating in the government’s concession scheme for transport 
infrastructure drove much of the growth in the country’s corporate bond market from 1990 to 2005. 
 Infrastructure sectors have played a major role in corporate bond market development in Chile largely 
because they have been able to attract a high credit rating, which has been key to the growth of the 
corporate bond market, given the importance of pension funds and insurance companies on the investor 
side, and the regulations that have governed their investment choices over the past two decades.
b Corporate 
bonds issued to finance infrastructure development in Chile amounted to 13 percent of all outstanding 
bonds as of the fourth quarter 2007. Excluding bonds issued outside the country, as well as bank bonds and 
securitizations, the proportion of corporate bonds issued by infrastructure providers rises to just under half 
of Chile’s total bond activity. 
a. The figure for corporate bonds outstanding as a percentage of total bonds for Chile is current as of 
September 2007 and sourced directly from Chile’s Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (SVS). 
b. The Chilean insurance sector’s investment in corporate bonds increased from 7 percent of total assets in 
1999 to 33 percent by 2006, according to the Central Bank of Chile. 
Equity markets 
To date, stock exchanges in the focus countries have played a minimal role in effectively mobilizing 
and allocating resources. Aside from the Johannesburg Securities Exchange, most African stock 
exchanges have very few listings (particularly by national companies), low liquidity levels, and 
inadequate market infrastructure. Trading activity is often concentrated in one or just a few stocks. 
Development of the region’s exchanges also has been hindered by high levels of poverty and the 
reluctance of local companies to become less reliant on bank finance and issue securities. That reluctance 
can be traced to insufficient resources, inexperience, wariness of financial disclosure requirements, and 
the cost of listings. On the demand side, there is a general lack of awareness of the benefits of investing in 
shares. In many African countries, most of the local investors who do invest in securities prefer short-term 
government securities that offer high and liquid returns. An underdeveloped institutional investor base, 
poor corporate governance practices, and inadequate protection of minority shareholder rights also stand 
in the way of well-functioning stock exchanges.  
To assess the actual and potential role of equity markets in financing infrastructure development and 
the depth of local and regional stock markets (where they exist), we used the following indicators: recent 
stock market capitalization, ratios of market capitalization to GDP, listing tallies, annual turnover ratios, 
the market capitalization of companies operating in infrastructure development sectors as a share of total 
market cap of listed companies, and the extent to which Africa-based firms are raising equity financing 
via cross-border listings on regional and international exchanges. These indicators are summarized in 
tables 5.6 and 5.9. 54 
 
Table 5.6    Equity markets in the focus countries at end-2006 
Country 
Stock market cap as 
percent of GDP 
Annual turnover ratio 
(%) 
Tally of listed 
companies 
Tally of listed 
companies in 
infrastructure sectors 
Market cap of 
infrastructure 
companies as share 
of total market cap of 
listed companies (%) 
BRVM total /3  9  3.3  40  6  47 
   of which:                
   Benin  —  —  1  0  0 
   Burkina Faso  —  —  0  0  0 
   Côte d’Ivoire  —  —  36  5  10 
   Niger  —  —  1  0  0 
   Senegal  —  —  1  1  100 
Cameroon  0 0 1 0 0 
Cape  Verde  3  7.1 3 0 0 
Ghana 29  2.1  32  0  0 
Kenya 49  14.6  52  3  18 
Malawi 27  3.5  11  0  0 
Mozambique  1  0.04 1 0 0 
Namibia 8  3.8  28  0  0 
Nigeria 27  13.6  202  10  0 
South Africa  245  48.8  377  25  8 
Sudan 12  20.6  52  2  50 
Tanzania 19  2.1  10  2  25 
Uganda  26  5.2 8 1  33 
Zambia   31  0.7  16  0  0 
Chile 129  18.5      47  27 
Malaysia 158  32.1      —  — 
Sources: Equity markets data are sourced from national securities exchanges and/or national regulatory authorities; S&P, Global Stock 
Markets Factbook 2007. 
Note: At the end of 2006, there were no organized equity markets in Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
and Rwanda. Note: GDP figures for 2006 are sourced from World Bank DDP database (Development Prospects Group annual estimates). The 
turnover ratio is defined as the total value of shares traded during the specified one-year period, divided by average market capitalization for 
the specified one-year period and the preceding one-year period. Turnover ratios for Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Malawi, 
Nigeria, Namibia, South Africa, Chile, and Malaysia are calculated by dividing total 2006 U.S.-dollar value traded by average U.S.-dollar market 
capitalization for 2005 and 2006. Data for the BRVM cover all eight member countries. Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Senegal 
are members of the BRVM, headquartered in Côte d’Ivoire but with trading floors in each member country. Companies domiciled in Côte 
d’Ivoire, Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Senegal have issued shares on the BRVM. 
— = Not available. 
 
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange in South Africa overshadows all other exchanges in the region. Its 
market capitalization of $621.6 billion at the end of 2006 accounted for nearly 90 percent of the total 
market capitalization in Sub-Saharan Africa. WAEMU’s eight member-country regional exchange, the 
BRVM, had a total market capitalization of only $4.16 billion and 40 equity listings at end-2006, 36 of 
which were from Côte d’Ivoire.  55 
 
In most countries with organized securities markets, including South Africa, the equity market is 
much larger than the corporate bond market, however.
63 Equity listing tallies and market capitalizations 
for the second- and third-largest stock exchanges—Nigeria and Kenya—were 202 ($32.82 billion) and 52 
($11.38 billion), respectively, at end-2006, compared with corporate bond listing tallies of three ($128.13 
million) and eight ($128.25 million), respectively. Total stock market capitalization as a percentage of 
GDP was less than 33 percent in all of the focus countries except Kenya (61 percent), Nigeria (33 
percent), and South Africa (295.5 percent). It was as low as 0.03 percent in Cameroon (with a single small 
listing). 
Annual turnover ratios (the value of shares traded for the year divided by year-end market 
capitalization) are very low, except in South Africa—often only a few stocks are traded. Annual turnover 
ratios in 2006 were less than 10 percent in 9 of the 14 national and regional stock markets covered in this 
study, and less than 1 percent for stock exchanges in Cameroon, Mozambique, and Zambia. At 48.8 
percent, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange had the highest turnover ratio by far among the focus 
countries, followed by Kenya’s at 14.6 percent. In contrast, most developed economy markets and some 
emerging economy markets had turnover ratios exceeding 100 percent. In 2006 Saudi Arabia had a 
turnover ratio of 288.4 percent, the highest worldwide (S&P 2007).  
Although equity markets tend to be larger and somewhat more developed than bond markets across 
the focus countries, infrastructure companies have accounted for a smaller share of the market 
capitalization of many national stock exchanges than of the corresponding national bond markets. Seven 
of the 14 organized national and regional stock exchanges that operate in the focus countries (those of 
Cape Verde, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia, and Cameroon) had no equity listings by 
infrastructure companies. Equity listings by companies operating in infrastructure sectors accounted for 
only 7.75 percent of the total market capitalization of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (table 5.7), 
versus 20.2 percent for South Africa’s Bond Exchange. The market capitalization of infrastructure 
companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, the second largest stock exchange, constituted a very 
tiny portion of total market capitalization (0.4 percent). On both the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange, infrastructure listings were mostly of companies providing civil 
engineering and construction services for transport infrastructure. Sudan’s stock exchange, the Khartoum 
Stock Exchange, had the highest share of market capitalization comprised of equity listings by 
infrastructure providers, at just below 50 percent as of end-2006. On the Khartoum Stock Exchange, this 
was nearly entirely comprised of a single large $2.3 billion issue by telecommunications company Sudan 
Telecom. West Africa’s regional exchange, the BRVM, had the next-highest share of infrastructure 
companies in overall market capitalization, at 47 percent as of end-2006. Infrastructure service providers 
listing shares on the BRVM cut across a range of subsectors—electricity generation, telecommunications, 
transport services, engineering and construction of roads, and water utilities—but an exceptionally large 
listing by a single telecoms company, Sonatel, accounted for 44 percent of market capitalization. 
                                                 
63 The size of South Africa’s corporate bond market vis-à-vis its equity market remains very small, estimated at 2–4 
percent of the size of the equity market at year-end 2006, according to the Bond Exchange of South Africa. 56 
 
Table 5.7. Outstanding equity issues by infrastructure providers on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 





% share of all 
corporate equity 
issues 
Transport infrastructure construction          
Aveng Ltd  Transport infrastructure construction   1,909.7    
Basil Read Hldgs Ltd  Transport (roads) construction  128.5    
Group Five Ltd Ord  Transport (roads) construction  653.5    
Wilson Bayly Hlm  Transport infrastructure construction   691.2    
Esor Ltd  Transport infrastructure construction   102.8    
Sanyati Holdings Ltd  Transport (roads) construction  60.2    
Transport services          
Comair Ltd  Aviation/commerical air  138.6    
Cargo Carriers Ltd  Trucking/shipping services  28.7    
Grindrod Ltd  Marine transport  1,048.9    
Imperial Holdings Ltd  Transportation services  4,931.9    
Millionair Charter Ltd  Aviation/commerical air  0.4    
Mobile Industries Ord  Transportation services  93.6    
Super Group Ltd  Transport/shipping services   670.9    
Trencor Ltd  Transport/shipping services   693.2    
Value Group Ltd  Transport/shipping services   89.4    
Spectrum Shipping  Marine transport/shipping  27.4    
Total transport     11,268.8  1.8 
Telecommunications          
Allied Technologies  Telecoms & equipment  941.6    
Mobile Telephone Networks  Telecoms  22,766.3    
Shawcell Telecomm Ltd  Telecoms  12.9    
Telkom South Africa  Telecoms  10,991.1    
Africa Cellular Towers  Telecoms  44.0    
Celcom Group  Telecoms  29.1    
Total Telecoms     34,785.0  5.6 
Electricity generation          
Murray and Roberts  Construction including in power generation  1,909.5    
Ipsa Group Plc  Electricity generation  56.0    
Total electricity generation     1,965.4  0.3 
Water and sanitation          
Enviroserv Holdings Ltd  Waste and disposal services  129.5    
Total water and sanitation     129.5  0.02 
Issues by entities in infrastructure sectors as 
% of all equity issues        7.7 
Source: Johannesburg Securities Exchange. 
Note: “Transport infrastructure construction” includes construction of roads, dams, harbors, power stations. 
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The national exchanges of East Africa also have a relatively high proportion of infrastructure 
providers among their equity listings—infrastructure companies accounted for 18 percent, 25 percent, and 
33 percent, respectively, of the markets capitalization of the Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Ugandan stock 
exchanges at the end of 2006. Kenya Airways’ primary listing on the Nairobi Stock Exchange and 
secondary listings on Uganda and Tanzania’s exchanges in 2001–02 have been credited with boosting 
both the market capitalization and trading volume of the latter two exchanges. Infrastructure service 
providers’ corporate bonds, however, accounted for a much higher share of total outstanding corporate 
bonds on the BRVM, the Nairobi Stock Exchange, and the Uganda Stock Exchange—at 97 percent, 51 
percent, and 58 percent, respectively.
64  
The telecommunications sector’s $4.1 billion in total equity issues outstanding was the most of any 
infrastructure sector (table 5.8). Two large issues by Senegal’s Sonatel on the BRVM and Sudan’s Sudan 
Telecom on the Khartoum Stock Exchange constituted 99.96 percent of that sum.  
The transport sector ranked second in terms of equity financing by infrastructure sectors. Equity 
issues for transport infrastructure accounted for 3.6 percent ($2.3 billion) of all corporate equity issues 
outstanding in these markets at end-2006, however, which was a smaller portion of total issues compared 
with corporate bond markets but a larger amount in absolute terms (table 5.9). The vast majority of the 
total was issued by firms providing transport services, rather than actual transport construction projects. 
Nearly all of the $63.7 million of equity issues for transport construction was for road construction 
(mainly issued by Nigerian firms). Five countries (Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan and Tanzania) 
were the domicile of all equity issues outstanding in the transport infrastructure sector. Electricity 
generation was the third-ranking infrastructure sector in terms of the value of equity issues outstanding—
95 percent of the share value in question was issued by Kenya’s electricity utilities, Kenya Power & 
Lighting, and KenGen.  
Cross-border listings by African firms and cross-border investment, while falling short of regionally 
integrating national exchanges, could help overcome impediments of small size, illiquidity, and 
inadequate market infrastructure and facilitate the ability of companies and governments to raise 
financing for infrastructural development. Cross-border listings and investment could improve firms’ 
ability to mobilize funds for expansion and provide for diversification of sources of capital. The eight-
member-country BRVM was established with this objective in mind. But although infrastructure 
companies have listed shares, overall listings, market capitalization, and trading activity remain low. In 
addition to the Kenya Airways cross-listing in East Africa, two other cross-border listings have been 
made on the three national exchanges in the East African Community. Some other notable debut cross-
border listings include those of Ecobank in West Africa on the BRVM, the Ghana Stock Exchange, and 
the Nairobi Stock Exchange.  
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Table 5.8  Outstanding equity issues by infrastructure providers in focus countries, except South Africa 
As of end-2006 except as noted 




country)  Securities exchange(s) 
Market cap of 
issues (US$ 
millions) 
% share of all equity 
issues in issuer’s 
domicile country /b 
Transport infrastructure construction             
Côte d’Ivoire  1  BRVM  2  0.1 
Nigeria 4  Nigeria  SE  62  0.3 
Sudan 1  Khartoum  SE  0.01  0.0002 
Transport services             
Côte d’Ivoire  2  BRVM  67  5 
Nigeria 3  Nigeria  SE  26  0.1 
Tanzania /a  1  Dar Es Salaam SE  20  0.8 
Kenya /a  3  Nairobi SE, USE, DSE  2,173  64 
Total transport        2,349  4 
Telecoms service providers             
Nigeria 1  Nigeria  SE  2  0.01 
Senegal 1  BRVM  1,827  100 
Sudan 1  Khartoum  SE  2,302  50 
Total telecoms        4,131  6 
Electricity generation/power             
Côte d’Ivoire  1  BRVM  53  4 
Kenya /a  4  Nairobi SE  1,235  11 
Nigeria 1  Nigeria  SE  15  0.06 
Total electricity generation/power        1,303  2 
Water & sanitation             
Côte d’Ivoire  1.0  BRVM  11  0.9 
Nigeria 1.0  Nigeria  SE  2  0.01 
Total water and sanitation        13  0.02 
Total equity issues by infrastructure providers        7,796.19  12 
Source: National and regional securities exchanges. 
Note: BRVM = Bourse régionale des valeurs mobiliéres; SE = stock exchange; DSE = Dar Es Salaam Stock Exchange; USE = Uganda Stock 
Exchange. 
a. For issues on Tanzania’s Dar Es Salaam Stock Exchange, the reference date is end-March 2007; for listings on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange, the date is end-June 2006. 
b. For individual issues, the percentage share of all listed issues in all sectors on the relevant national exchange, with the exception of BRVM-
listed stocks; for BRVM-listed stocks, the percentage share of all listed issues in all sectors for the country of domicile. For sector totals, the 
percentage share is given as a share of all listed corporate equity issues in focus countries, except South Africa, on June 30, 2006. 
 
The majority of cross-border listings by African-domiciled firms have been carried out on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange and, to a lesser extent, the Namibian Stock Exchange (which has trading 
technology links and other ties with the Johannesburg Stock Exchange). These two exchanges had 22 and 59 
 
19 such listings, respectively (table 5.9).
65 Malawi’s small exchange in southern Africa also had two 
secondary listings from within the subregion, and the Zambian and Sudanese exchanges each had one. 
The cross-border listings on the southern African exchanges have been primarily in the banking, retail, 
and mining sectors, however. Indeed, aside from Kenya Airways, there have not yet been cross-border 
equity listings by companies providing infrastructure services on the national exchanges covered in this 
study.  
Table 5.9  Cross-listings and overseas listings by companies in focus countries at end-2006 
Country 
Market cap of 
infrastructure 
companies as share of 
total market cap of 
listed companies (%) 
Tally of African 
domiciled firms cross-
/dual listed on other 
exchanges in the SSA 
region 
Tally of African 
domiciled firms listed 
on international 
exchanges 
BRVM total   47  1  0 
   of which:          
   Benin  0  —  — 
   Burkina Faso  0  —  — 
   Côte d’Ivoire  10  —  — 
   Niger  0  —  — 
   Senegal  100  —  — 
Cameroon 0  0  0 
Cape Verde  0  0  0 
Ghana 0  1  1 
Kenya 18  3  0 
Malawi 0  2  1 
Mozambique 0  0  0 
Namibia 0  19  2 
Nigeria 0.4  1  0 
South Africa  8  22  21 
Sudan 50  1  1 
Tanzania 25  3  0 
Uganda 33  3  0 
Zambia   0  1  1 
Source: Equity markets data are sourced from national/regional securities exchanges and/or national regulatory authorities. 
Note: At the end of 2006, there were no organized equity markets in Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
and Rwanda.Data for the eight-member country BRVM. Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger and Senegal are all members of the BRVM, 
headquartered in Côte d’Ivoire but with trading floors in each member country. Companies domiciled in Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Niger and Senegal have issued shares on the BRVM. 
— = Not available. 
 
A N$500 million, 13-year, rand-denominated corporate bond issued in August 2007 by Namibia’s 
electricity utility, Nampower, was the first infrastructure-finance bond to be dual listed on two Sub-
Saharan exchanges: the Bond Exchange of South Africa, where it was able to access South Africa’s large 
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Johannesburg Stock Exchange have created uncertainties regarding possible shifts in capital flows toward 
Johannesburg within the South African Development Community. 60 
 
investment base, and the exchange in its country of domicile, the Namibia Stock Exchange. In the latter 
case, the stated purpose of the financing is regional. It is to be used mainly for constructing a linkage 
between the electricity networks of Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia, creating an alternative channel 
for electricity imports and exports between the countries in southern Africa. 
There were only two firms operating in an infrastructure sector and based in an African focus country 
that were listed on an international exchange, both of which were in the telecoms sector. South Africa’s 
Telkom SA, Ltd. was listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and Sudan’s telecommunications 
company, Sudatel, was listed on the Abu Dhabi and Dubai exchanges in the United Arab Emirates—as 
well as having listings on their home exchanges. Aside from Sudatel and Telkom, firms based in African 
focus countries and listed on international exchanges tended to operate in natural resources or financial 
services and favored listings on major European stock exchanges, such as the London Stock Exchange 
and Euronext. The small representation of infrastructure sector firms based in focus countries largely 
reflects an overall small number of focus-country-domiciled firms listed on international exchanges—
with the exception of South African firms, only 21 have listings on major overseas exchanges. South 
Africa’s financial services firm, Old Mutual, has listings on the London exchange and on the exchanges 
of three focus countries (South Africa, Malawi, and Namibia). Barloworld, a diversified South African 
corporation involved in financial services, distribution, and manufacturing, has listings on Euronext 
(Brussels) and the London, Frankfurt, and Swiss exchanges, in addition to the Johannesburg and 
Namibian exchanges. Anglogold-Ashanti, formed from a merger in 2004 of Anglogold and Ghana’s 
Ashanti Goldfield’s gold-mining concern, is headquartered in South Africa and has its primary listing on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, with secondary listings on the Ghana Stock Exchange, as well as 
several international exchanges worldwide: the New York Stock Exchange, Australia Stock Exchange, 
London Stock Exchange, and Euronext (Paris and Brussels). Aside from these South African firms and 
Sudan’s Sudatel, there was only one other firm headquartered in a focus country with a listing on an 
African international exchange as well as its home exchange: ZCCM (Zambian Consolidated Copper 
Mines) Investment Holdings is listed on Euronext (Paris) and the London Stock Exchange, as well as the 
Lusaka Stock Exchange.  
Various initiatives to integrate capital markets within and across subregions—notably, within the 
Southern African Development Community; among East African Community members Kenya, Tanzania, 
and Uganda; and among the BRVM and the Nigerian and Ghanaian securities exchanges in West 
Africa—have achieved some progress toward harmonizing rules, technology, and systems. Those 
achievements are expected to pave the way for more cross-border listings from companies based in the 
region, potentially offering issuers access to much wider markets, boosting the supply of listed securities, 
and increasing market capitalization and liquidity. However, the potential for raising capital for 
infrastructure development through cross-border listings and investment remains largely untapped.  
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6    Conclusions and policy recommendations 
With the obvious exception of South Africa, local financial markets in the African focus countries 
remain underdeveloped, shallow, and small in scale. Locally sourced financing with maturity terms 
commensurate with the longer-term horizons of infrastructure projects is particularly scarce. Official 
development assistance thus remains an important source of (external) financing in Africa, particularly for 
those focus countries with very low levels of financial intermediation.
66 Private participation in 
infrastructure (PPI) can also serve as a significant external financing source for infrastructure projects in 
certain niche sectors and has undergone a resurgence in recent years.
67 There is growing awareness, 
however, of the need to explore the potential for accessing local and regional sources of private financing, 
particularly as national financial market reforms, in many cases taking a regional approach, gather 
increasing momentum across the countries.  
Macroeconomic stability, financial depth, and infrastructure financing 
Sound macroeconomic policies provide the foundations for developing a national financial system 
that makes available sustainable and affordable medium- to long-term finance, which can be accessed for 
infrastructure development. In the absence of macroeconomic stability, sources of medium- to long-term 
finance at predictable (preferably fixed) interest rates required by infrastructure projects are scarce if not 
nonexistent. The overall trend in the focus countries has been one of improvement in macroeconomic 
policies and performance in recent years, as reflected in the macroeconomic stability indicators discussed 
in chapter 1. But in several countries one or more key indicators of macroeconomic stability—volume of 
savings, savings rates, and ratios of domestic and external debt to GDP—fall far short of the foundations 
needed for well-functioning local financial markets capable of financing infrastructure. It is important for 
the focus countries, including those that have made good progress in recent years, to build on the regional 
momentum to further macroeconomic and structural reforms to accelerate sustainable economic growth, 
reduce poverty, raise living standards, increase their ability to weather external shocks, and provide an 
enabling environment for private sector activity and financing.  
A minimum degree of financial intermediation is needed to establish a market for term finance that 
could potentially serve as a source of finance for local infrastructure. Chapter 2 looked at the levels of 
financial depth and intermediation in the focus countries based on selected indicators. The level of 
financial depth (as indicated by the ratio of total financial intermediaries’ assets to GDP) of the majority 
of the focus countries is very low, with 15 of 24 countries having ratios below 25 percent. Three countries 
have ratios of financial intermediaries’ assets to GDP exceeding 100 percent (Cape Verde and Namibia, 
as well as South Africa), but the next highest ratio is only 52 percent (Kenya). Ratios of private credit by 
banks to GDP also point to a low level of financial intermediation in a large majority of the focus 
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Gleneagles in 2005. 
67 Annual PPI flows to the region tripled over the past decade (to $8.7 billion in 2006), outpacing recent ODA flows. 62 
 
countries—with three quarters (18) of the countries having ratios below 20 percent (eight of which have 
ratios of less than 10 percent). Bank credit to the private sector in these countries has been constrained by 
various structural impediments to lending that can include, inter alia, poor credit discipline, deficiencies 
in national legal and judicial frameworks, administrative controls on lending rates, and high transaction 
costs.  
With the exception of South Africa—which has a financial sector that is significantly larger and more 
developed than those of all of the other African focus countries—the ability of commercial banks in the 
focus countries to finance infrastructure projects is thus impeded. In addition to the structural constraints 
to lending noted above, there would be a significant asset-liability maturity mismatch in the case of most 
banks in the region, given that African banks’ deposits and other liabilities currently tend to have largely 
short-term maturities, while infrastructure projects require medium- to long-term financing. Longer-term 
deposits are needed to finance longer term credit commitments. Moreover, structural constraints to 
lending in some of these countries make banks highly risk averse. Lending to the private sector thus tends 
to be generally short in tenor. In financial markets where banks make credit available at medium- to long-
terms, they often concentrate their lending to a select few, large corporate blue-chip borrowers.  
Even for the five focus countries (in addition to South Africa), where long-term loans with maturities 
greater than 20 years are available (Ghana, Lesotho, Namibia, Uganda, and Zambia), average interest 
rates exceed 20 percent in two of these countries (Ghana and Zambia), thus rendering them hardly 
affordable for infrastructure lending purposes. This is because it is difficult to find infrastructure projects 
that generate sufficient returns to cover a cost of debt that is greater than 20 percent. 
Despite the overall scarcity of affordable medium- to long-term financing from banks, the share of 
bank loans used to finance infrastructure in the focus countries has been on an overall upward trend in 
recent years. In 12 of the 20 countries for which time-series data are available, there was an increase in 
bank loans outstanding to sectors that develop infrastructure, relative to total loans. At the same time, it 
must be noted that these figures vary widely from country to country, however, and the absolute amount 
of lending is relatively small, with the exception of South Africa and Nigeria. Excluding South Africa, the 
total amount of outstanding loans to infrastructure sectors for all the other 22 focus countries for which 
recent data are available is just $5 billion—roughly equal to the corresponding amount for Malaysia alone 
and well below the corresponding amount for Chile alone.  
The sector known in many national accounts as “transport, communication, and storage” was the 
destination of the largest amount of local bank loans outstanding at the end of 2006 for the 23 focus 
countries that reported such data: just over $8.3 billion, or nearly three-quarters of the $11.3 billion in 
total loans outstanding for infrastructure financing for all countries reporting these data. Electricity, water, 
and gas was the destination of the next-largest amount by overall sector category: $2.7 billion, or just 
under one-quarter of the total bank loans outstanding for infrastructure financing. 
For the majority of the 24 focus countries, however, the capacity of local banking systems would be 
too small and remains too constrained by structural impediments to adequately finance their 
infrastructural development needs. There may be somewhat more potential in this regard for syndicated 
lending to infrastructure projects with the participation of local banks, which had been on an overall trend 
of increase in recent years, albeit with significant variability across the countries and from a very low 63 
 
base. Notably, the share of syndicated lending for infrastructure denominated in local currencies increased 
for the focus countries in 2000–06 and a few of the recent syndicated loans to these countries were 
specially structured to reduce the risks of currency mismatch. 
Growing potential role of institutional investors 
Well-functioning institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies typically seek 
out financial liabilities that are medium- to long-term—liabilities that would better match the longer terms 
of infrastructure projects than those of banks. Well-regulated institutional investors would thus have 
significant potential to be natural sources of longer-term financing, including for infrastructure 
development. To exploit that potential, it will be important to continue with financial sector reforms that 
develop capital markets, including by encouraging the establishment of appropriately regulated, privately 
managed pension funds and other institutional investors with long-term investment horizons. This would 
be a key step toward improving financial intermediation in these markets and would pave the way for 
these financial institutions to serve as a well-needed source of financing for infrastructure. Moreover, the 
competition that would arise in an appropriately-regulated national system that allows private pension 
funds to operate alongside state-run funds could not only help develop capital markets but it would 
reward good management and better analyses of investment alternatives. It would also constitute a key 
step toward enhancing efficiency and competition in the financial sector in general. 
In many of the countries, however, regulatory and supervisory frameworks remain inadequate and/or 
inappropriate and, in some cases, the necessary framework does not exist at all. Overly restrictive 
regulations governing pension-fund investments—often placing an excessive emphasis on stability and 
uniform portfolio performance, without regard for return—have tended to result in investment practices in 
many focus countries that have made it difficult or impossible for national pension funds to invest in 
infrastructure assets. In some focus countries, state-run institutional investors continue to enjoy special 
exemptions from regulations governing their activities, also resulting in suboptimal investment practices. 
At the same time, investment vehicles in these countries excluding South Africa are still limited, 
reflecting the underdeveloped state of local capital markets. Moreover, institutional investors lack the 
ability to undertake the credit-risk evaluation necessary ahead of involvement in infrastructure 
development projects. Investment practices of institutional investors in these countries consequently often 
favor illiquid real estate holdings, short-term bank deposits and government securities. 
Although data limitations impede an accurate evaluation of the extent to which institutional investors 
in the focus countries invest their assets specifically in local infrastructure, available data reported by 
institutional investors and their regulators indicate that the amount is relatively small. Of the three focus 
countries—Cape Verde, Tanzania, and Uganda—that have specifically reported pension system 
investments in infrastructure, the total combined amount was estimated at $31.5 million as of mid-2007, 
or a tiny 0.03 percent of the total combined estimated assets of $91.8 billion for all national pension 
systems in the focus countries for which data were available. 
There are signs of change on the horizon, however. Private pension providers have begun to emerge 
across the countries, particularly in the past several years, as a way for private sector employers in several 
countries to attract staff in response to national capital market reforms. At the same time, there is an 64 
 
overall trend of shift away from defined-benefit to defined contribution schemes across many of the focus 
countries, with the latter viewed as less costly, more transparent, and easier to manage. If this trend 
ultimately fosters development of a well-managed, appropriately regulated institutional investor base with 
private fund participation, the volume of assets under management by these financial institutions could 
grow significantly in future years. Moreover, for those countries for which time-series data on the 
allocation of pension-system assets are available (Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, South Africa, Zambia), 
there are clear signs overall of a more diversified portfolio approach to asset allocation and some 
indications of a shift away from large holdings in assets generating little or no returns. 
There also is scope for an intraregional response to increasing available financing for infrastructure 
projects with the participation of African institutional investors and other financial services providers. 
One concrete initiative to this end, a Pan-African Infrastructure Development Fund (PAIDF), established 
in mid-2007, is a 15-year fund designed to raise financing for commercially viable infrastructure 
development projects in Africa, with investment commitments in its first close, in July 2007, of $625 
million, including from South African and Ghanaian institutional investors. South Africa’s Government 
Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) committed $250 million to PAIDF as of mid-2007; South African 
insurer Old Mutual committed $50 million; Ghana’s SSNIT state pension fund committed $10 million; 
and Metropolitan, a South African provider of insurance, pension and other financial services, committed 
$10 million. The remaining $305 million was committed by African banks, including the African 
Development Bank and the Development Bank of Southern Africa.  
South Africa’s Public Investment Corporation, an investment management company owned by the 
South African government, initiated the PAIDF and has set a total capitalization goal of $1 billion, 
following a second funding round targeting international institutional investors as well as institutional 
investors from more African countries. The fund’s managers are aware that greater investment 
commitments from institutional investors from a broader range of African countries will in several cases 
require the easing of national legislative obstacles that currently impede their participation.  
Local capital markets: bonds and equities 
With the exception of South Africa, the focus countries’ local capital markets are shallow and illiquid. 
They thus have not played a major role in financing infrastructure projects to date (table 6.1). In recent 
years, there has been an identifiable trend across the countries, however, whereby governments have 
begun to issue debt at longer tenors in an attempt to establish benchmark yield curves for later corporate 
and parastatal bond issues, as part of an overall aim to develop local capital markets and improve debt 
management.  
Government bond issues on local markets that are specifically designated for raising infrastructure 
financing remain rare in the focus countries, with only Nigeria and Senegal having a designated issue 
outstanding as of end-2006. The actual share of government bond financing going toward infrastructural 
development is likely higher for the focus countries than is indicated by the data for the few issues 
specifically designated for infrastructure financing, however, given that some of the financing raised on 
local capital markets via government bond issues may have been allocated toward this financing purpose. 65 
 
Where they exist at all, corporate bond markets in the focus countries are undeveloped, with few 
issues, except in South Africa, where corporate issues had been growing faster than government issues in 
recent years. Due to factors including a lack of financial product diversity and the small number and size 
of issues, most of the corporate bonds in these countries rarely trade and are often held to maturity, with 
the investors tending to adopt a buy-hold strategy.  
Table 6.1 Overview of countries’ locally sourced infrastructure financing by financial instrument 
Amount outstanding at end-2006 or most recent available (US$ millions) 
   Bank loans /a  Government bonds /b  Corporate bonds  Equity issues 
Benin  123.6 0  51.9 0 
Burkina  Faso  84.5 0  39.4 0 
Cameroon  — — —  0 
Cape Verde  107.6  —  n.a.  0 
Chad  0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Congo,  Dem.  Rep.  5.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Côte d’Ivoire  334.7  0  n.a.  133.4 
Ethiopia  247.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Ghana  177.9 0 0 0 
Kenya 574.5  0  64.8  3,408.0 
Lesotho  20.9  0 n.a. n.a. 
Madagascar  67.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Malawi  17.4 0  n.a. 0 
Mozambique  60.7 0  13.2 0 
Namibia  117.1 0  298 0 
Niger  66.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Nigeria  2,443.6  46.8 0 0 
Rwanda  25.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Senegal  286.0 93.3 66.6  1,827.1 
South Africa  6,274.9  762.8  6,841.3  48,148.7 
Sudan  5.2 — —  2,302.3 
Tanzania  93.0 0 0 0 
Uganda  74.9 0 7 0 
Zambia  72.9  n.a. 7 0 
Sources: National finance ministries, national/regional central banks and securities exchanges. 
a. Total outstanding loans to infrastructure sectors. Data for end-2006 with the exception of: Democratic Republic of the Congo (end-2003); 
Madagascar (end-2004); Namibia (end-June 2005); Tanzania (end-2005); Ghana (June 2006); South Africa (end-Sept. 2006); Zambia (May 
2007); Chad (March 2006). 
b. The actual amount of government bonds financing infrastructure may be an underestimate as specific financing purpose for these bond 
issues is generally unavailable. 
— = Not available; n.a. = Not applicable (no such issues/no organized market). 
The importance of corporate bonds issued to finance infrastructure  
Despite the generally underdeveloped state of these markets and significant variance in the extent to 
which corporate bonds are financing infrastructure across the countries, new corporate bond issuers 
operating in infrastructure sectors appear to be coming to the market, in at least one case constituting the 66 
 
market’s debut issue. The share of corporate bonds outstanding that was issued to finance infrastructure 
exceeded 50 percent in 7 of 12 focus countries that had such bonds outstanding at the end of 2006, though 
the overall amounts were small. It is also worth noting that in Chile, one of the comparator countries for 
this study, issuers of bonds in infrastructure sectors such as public utilities, the transport sector, and 
construction of transport infrastructure have played a major part in the development of the corporate bond 
market over the past few decades.  
Perhaps the most striking finding of this research is that a larger share of the total amount of corporate 
bonds outstanding went toward infrastructure as of end-2006 than was the case for other local sources of 
financing, for the 23 focus countries excluding South Africa (table 6.2). That is, for these 23 countries as 
a group, corporate bonds are more likely to be used for infrastructure purposes than are local bank loans, 
government bonds, or equity issues. More than half of the total amount of corporate bonds outstanding at 
the end of 2006 (albeit a small amount overall) was for infrastructure. Equity issues ranked next in this 
respect, with 12 percent of total equity issues outstanding for the 23 countries. Despite the predominance 
of banks in the financial systems of these countries, only 10 percent of outstanding bank loans were for 
infrastructure purposes. 
Table 6.2 Overview of financial instruments for locally sourced infrastructure financing: Focus countries excluding 
South Africa 










AICD excl. South Africa: Total outstanding, all financing purposes  49,046.5  12,389.0  1,060.8  65,528.4 
AICD excl. South Africa: Total outstanding financing infrastructure (% of total)  10  1  52  12 
AICD excl. South Africa: Total outstanding financing infrastructure (US$ millions)  5,007.9  140.1  548.1  7,796.2 
  Of which:             
  Transport   236.0     360.6  2,349.4 
  Telecoms  33.1     124.3  4,131.0 
  Transport, communications and storage   3,076.5          
  Electricity generation/power  1,430.9     58.9  1,302.9 
  Water and sanitation  Note a        12.9 
  Other /c  231.4  140.1  4.4    
Sources: National/regional central banks and securities exchanges. 
a. Fairly broad catch-all categories for economic sectors in use by central banks in several countries, such as “transport, communications, and 
storage” (seven countries) and “transport, communication, energy and water” (four countries), make it difficult to disaggregate lending by 
specific infrastructure sectors. The amount of bank loans outstanding to the telecoms sector (and the electricity and water sectors) is likely 
higher than indicated because of the use of such catch-all categories; similarly, bank loans to transport are likely lower than indicated. 
b. The actual amount of government bonds financing infrastructure may be an underestimate as specific financing purpose for these bond 
issues is generally unavailable. Some of the financing raised via these issues may have been allocated toward infrastructure financing.  
c. “Other” consists of large catch-all categories, including “public works” (which cannot be disaggregated). 
 
Telecommunications companies had the highest number of bond issues outstanding (five) among 
companies operating in infrastructure sectors in the focus countries (excluding South Africa). But as 
indicated in chapter 3, the transport sector was the predominant infrastructure sector in terms of the 
amount of total corporate bonds outstanding for these countries—with a few large issues from Namibia 67 
 
and Senegal accounting for two-thirds of the total $548 million in corporate bonds outstanding by 
infrastructure providers.  
With medium- to long-term bank financing costly and scarce, and macroeconomic conditions 
stabilizing in a number of the focus countries, corporate bond financing is increasingly seen as a viable 
alternative by firms, including those operating in infrastructure sectors. Further progress is needed in 
many countries, however, in developing a benchmark for pricing in the form of a well-established yield 
curve, maintaining low and stable inflation rates and interest rates, improving corporate governance and 
transparency, developing a larger and well-regulated institutional investor base, putting in place credible 
rating agencies, and increasing awareness of prospective issuers and investors. 
With the exception of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the stock exchanges of the focus countries 
have a small number of equity listings (particularly by local companies), very low ratios of market 
capitalization to GDP, and low turnover ratios. They have not yet contributed substantially to efficient 
resource mobilization and allocation. Although equity markets tend to be larger and somewhat more 
developed than bond markets across the countries, companies providing infrastructure services have 
accounted for a relatively smaller percentage of the market capitalization of many national stock 
exchanges than of the corresponding national bond markets. Seven of the 14 organized national and 
regional stock exchanges that operate in these countries (those of Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ghana, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zambia) had no equity listings by companies operating in 
infrastructure at the end of 2006. In contrast, bond listings by companies operating in infrastructure 
sectors comprised more than half of total outstanding bonds listed on two of these exchanges (those of 
Mozambique and Namibia). In South Africa, equity listings by companies operating in infrastructure 
comprised only 7.8 percent of the total market capitalization of South Africa’s stock exchange, as 
opposed to 20 percent of the country’s bond exchange (table 6.3).  
Table 6.3 Overview of financial instruments for locally sourced infrastructure financing: South Africa 
Amount outstanding at end-2006 or most recent available (US$ millions) 




bonds  Equity issues 
South Africa: Total outstanding, all financing purposes  249,020.2  62,858.0  33,817.2  621,633.8 
South Africa: Total outstanding financing infrastructure (% of total)  3  1  20  8 
South Africa: Total outstanding financing infrastructure (US$ millions)  6,274.9  762.8  6,841.3  48,148.7 
  Of which:             
  Transport        772.5  11,268.8 
  Telecoms        1,929.1  34,785.0 
  Transport, communications, and storage   5,011.0          
  Electricity generation/power  1,263.8     3,613.9  1,965.4 
  Water and sanitation           129.5 
  Other /a     762.8  525.8    
Source: South African Reserve Bank, Johannesburg Securities Exchange, Bond Exchange of South Africa. 
a. See corresponding notes, table 6.2. 
 
Infrastructure companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, the second-largest stock exchange 
among the focus countries, comprised a very tiny portion of the exchange’s total market capitalization 68 
 
(0.4 percent). West Africa’s regional exchange, the Bourse régionale des valeurs mobilières (BRVM), had 
the highest share of infrastructure companies in its market capitalization—47 percent as of end-2006.  
In contrast to the picture in corporate bond markets, issuers of telecommunications equities 
overshadowed other infrastructure sectors, accounting for 53 percent (just under $4 billion) of total equity 
issues outstanding by infrastructure companies in the focus countries, excluding South Africa.
68 The vast 
majority of the amount, however, consisted of two exceptionally large issues, by Senegal’s Sonatel on the 
BRVM and Sudan Telecom on the Khartoum Stock Exchange. More cross-border listings and investment 
could greatly facilitate the ability to raise finance for infrastructure  
Cross-border listings (of both corporate bonds and equity issues) by firms in the focus countries and 
cross-border investment fell short of regional integration of national exchanges. Nevertheless, such cross-
border activity could help overcome national capital markets’ impediments of small size, illiquidity, and 
inadequate market infrastructure and, in so doing, facilitate the ability of companies and governments in 
these countries to raise financing for infrastructure development.  
So far, however, this regional approach to raising infrastructure financing remains largely untapped. 
Aside from Kenya Airways, there have not yet been cross-border equity listings by companies in 
infrastructure sectors on the national and regional exchanges in the focus countries. A $62.2 million, 13-
year, rand-denominated corporate bond issued in August 2007 by Namibia’s electricity utility, 
Nampower, became the first bond raising finance for an infrastructure sector to be dual listed on two Sub-
Saharan African exchanges: the Bond Exchange of South Africa, where it gained access to South Africa’s 
large investment base, and the Namibia Stock Exchange. In this latter case, the purpose of the financing is 
also regional—proceeds are to be used to link the electricity networks of Namibia, South Africa, and 
Zambia, creating an alternative channel for electricity imports and exports among the countries in the 
southern Africa subregion. 
Various initiatives to integrate capital markets within and across subregions—notably, within the 
Southern African Development Community; among East African Community members Kenya, Tanzania, 
and Uganda; and among the BRVM and the Nigerian and Ghanaian securities exchanges in West 
Africa—have achieved some progress toward harmonizing rules, technology, and systems. Building 
further on these initiatives could pave the way for more cross-border listings from infrastructure providers 
and other companies based in the region, potentially offering issuers access to much wider markets, 
boosting the supply of listed securities, and increasing market capitalization and liquidity.  
 
 
                                                 
68 In South Africa, equity issues by telecoms providers predominated, accounting for 72 percent ($34.8 billion) of 
the total outstanding equity issues by infrastructure providers. Mobile Telephone Network’s $22.8 billion equity 
issue made up the lion’s share. 69 
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Appendix 1   Sovereign credit ratings 
In the past several years, a number of Sub-Saharan African countries, including several low-income 
countries, have newly applied for and obtained sovereign credit ratings. This marks a significant change 
from the situation in the late 1990s, when only South Africa had a sovereign credit rating among all 
countries in the region. Programs sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
and the U.S. government subsidize some of the initial application cost and other fees. These programs 
aim, at least in the short term, to put these countries “on the road” to being able to access international 
capital markets in future and to attract a larger share of foreign investment, particularly foreign direct 
investment. A sovereign credit rating is thought to make it easier for foreign investors and other potential 
sources of external financing to assess risk. 
Sovereign credit ratings can provide some indication of a country’s investment climate, 
creditworthiness, and capacity to service existing debt. Many low-income countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are still considered too risky despite significant improvement in fundamentals. There is not as 
much information on these so called frontier markets as there is for middle-income emerging-market 
economies. Thus, additional perceived benefits of obtaining a sovereign credit rating is that a rating 
signals a government’s intention to open its books to public scrutiny and that the ratings process can 
foster governmental transparency. On the other hand, a credit rating secured prematurely—in cases where 
a country is unable to secure an investment grade rating—could deter the ability to attract foreign private 
capital that would promote sustainable economic development. The ratings methodology used for 
sovereigns assesses many of the same variables as those which are typically looked at by prospective 
foreign direct investors.
69 To the extent that prospective investors consult a country’s ratings report to 
determine its investment climate, a rating could discourage some foreign investment that might otherwise 
go to strong enclave sectors, especially in the case of a low speculative grade rating. 
As of September 2007, 16 of the 24 focus countries had obtained ratings from one or more of the 
three major international ratings agencies (table A1.1).
70 Of these 16 countries, 11 are low-income 
countries. All of the low-income focus countries that have been rated, except Kenya and Nigeria, which 
are not part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, have also recently seen declines in 
their debt burdens due to multilateral debt relief granted under the HIPC Initiative and Multilateral Debt 
Relief Initiative. Oil revenues have enabled Nigeria to cut down its external debt: it has paid all of its 
Paris Club debt and nearly all of its London Club debt.  
                                                 
69 For example, S&P ranks each sovereign on a scale for a number of categories, including political risk, national 
income and economic structure, economic growth prospects, fiscal and monetary performance indicators, financial 
sector’s effectiveness in intermediating funds, competitiveness and profitability of nonfinancial private sector, and 
even labor flexibility. 
70 These countries comprise upper- middle-income country South Africa; lower-middle-income countries Cameroon, 
Cape Verde, Lesotho and Namibia; and low-income countries Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and Uganda.  73 
 
Table A1.1  Sovereign credit ratings, savings rates, and status under HIPC Initiative 
Country  Fitch  Moody’s  Standard & Poor’s 
Gross 
domestic 




   Sep-07  Sep-07  Sep-07  2005  Sep-07 
Investment grade                
Chile A  A2  A/Positive/A-1  31  n.a. 
Malaysia A-  A3  A-/Positive/A-2  43  n.a. 
South Africa  BBB+  Baa1  BBB+/Stable/A-2  17  n.a. 
Namibia BBB-  n.a.  n.a.  27  n.a. 
Non-investment grade (B+ — BB-)          
Lesotho BB-  n.a.  n.a.  -16  n.a. 
Nigeria BB-  n.a.  BB-/Stable/B  39  n.a. 
Cape Verde  B+  n.a.  n.a.  -5  n.a. 
Ghana B+  n.a.  B+/Stable/B  3  Completion  point 
Kenya n.a.  n.a.  B+/Stable/B  9  n.a. 
Senegal n.a.  n.a.  B+/Negative/B  9  Completion  point 
Non-investment grade (B)          
Benin B  n.a.  B/Stable/B  7  Completion  point 
Burkina Faso  n.a.  n.a.  B/Postive/B  —  Completion point 
Cameroon B  n.a.  B/Stable/B  19  Completion  point 
Madagascar n.a.  n.a.  B/Stable/B  8  Completion  point 
Mozambique B  n.a.  B/Positive/B  11  Completion  point 
Uganda B  n.a.      Completion  point 
Non-investment grade (B- or less)          
Malawi B-  n.a.  n.a.  -12  Completion  point 
Rwanda B-  n.a.  n.a.  2  Completion  point 
Unrated AICD countries           
Chad n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  37  Decision  point 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  6  Decision point 
Côte d’Ivoire  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  18  Pre-decision point 
Ethiopia n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  4  Completion  point 
Niger n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  9  Completion  point 
Sudan n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  13  Pre-decision  point 
Tanzania n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  10  Completion  point 
Zambia n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  17  Completion  point 
— = Not available; n.a. = Not applicable. 
Ratings sources: Fitch, Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s (downloaded form each ratings agency website in September 2007).  
Savings rates are sourced from World Bank, WDI; HIPC Initiative status is sourced from the World Bank, HIPC Initiative web pages (Sept. 
2007). 
 
African low-income countries that have recently received ratings pursuant to debt relief tend to be 
rated in the upper speculative grade classifications (BB and B ratings by ratings agencies Standard & 
Poor’s and Fitch), while Namibia, a lower-middle-income country, joined South Africa and Botswana in 74 
 
the investment grade category, albeit in the lowest classifications of BBB- for its long-term foreign 
currency debt and BBB for long-term local currency debt.
71 Investment-grade sovereign credit ratings 
mean that a country is unlikely to default on its sovereign debt. Speculative, or non-investment grade, 
ratings signal a higher probability of default or indicate that a default has already occurred.
72  
Sovereign credit ratings allow investors to differentiate countries’ credit risk profiles, and they could 
promote investment by mature institutional investors—a major source of capital to emerging markets—
that are constrained, in part, by the absence of credit ratings. The investment grade ratings assigned to 
Botswana and South Africa are seen as having raised foreign investor interest. 
It is still unclear, however, how the recently assigned sovereign ratings to African focus countries 
rated noninvestment grade have affected the ability of these countries to attract private capital, 
particularly capital flows that would enhance sustainable economic development. Private capital flows to 
some of the newly rated countries increased, at times significantly, in the period following their ratings, 
particularly portfolio investment in local-currency debt issues sourced from foreign investors. Much of 
that interest, however, can be attributed to the liquidity of international financial markets over the period, 
which prompted portfolio investors to go further afield in search of yield. Indeed, Zambia attracted a very 
large amount of foreign portfolio investment inflows over the past few years through the end of 2007 
even though it lacks a sovereign credit rating. Moreover, in Nigeria foreign investors reportedly held 18 
percent of total marketable debt at the end of 2005 (IMF 2006d), ahead of that country obtaining a credit 
rating. It may become clearer how noninvestment grade credit ratings impact the relative ability of these 
countries to attract capital in the tight credit conditions that currently prevail. The illiquidity and lack of 
depth that continues to characterize nascent local African bond markets means that foreign investors, 
overall, prefer shorter maturities and avoid longer maturities because of the risk that an early exit could 
require a steep discount.
73 Without well-developed local institutional investors that could take up these 
securities in the event of a withdrawal by foreign investors, the underdeveloped local bond markets are 
vulnerable, especially since there are indications that much of these early foreign investment inflows are 
from foreign hedge funds and other investors with short-term horizons (World Bank 2007b). 
Sovereign credit ratings that have been assigned to focus countries do show an overall relationship 
between countries with the highest ratings, on one hand, and the highest savings rates and most-developed 
financial systems, on the other, compared with the lowest-rated countries, however (table A1.1). The 
countries rated investment grade all have savings rates above 25 percent; the countries with the lowest 
rating of B-, Malawi and Rwanda, have savings rates below 5 percent. The level of financial 
                                                 
71 Major ratings agencies often rate sovereign foreign currency obligations below local currency obligations because 
sovereigns are considered to have a higher probability of default on foreign currency than local currency debt. See, 
for example, Cavanaugh 2005.  
72 The two largest international ratings agencies— Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s —have ratings categorization 
systems that divide ratings into investment grade (Aaa–Baa and AAA–BBB, respectively) and speculative or non-
investment grade (Ba–C and BB–D, respectively). According to Fitch Ratings’ definitions, investment grade ratings 
are in the AAA–BBB categories and speculative (non-investment-grade) ratings are in the BB–D range. 
73 In fact, in the past few years, foreign investment flows have tapered off or come to a sudden stop in some African 
markets (for example, Botswana) as governments have reduced or halted new issuance at shorter maturities as part 
of an effort to lengthen the maturity profile to restructure government financing and establish a benchmark yield 
curve for corporate bond issues. 75 
 
intermediation, as measured by the ratio of private credit by banks and other nonbank financial 
institutions to GDP, also is high in investment–grade rated countries: South Africa, 145 percent; Namibia, 
62 percent; Chile, 87 percent; and Malaysia, 118 percent (see chapter 2). Predictably, Malawi and 
Rwanda have very low levels of financial intermediation according to this indicator, at 12 percent and 14 
percent, respectively.  
The correlation is less clear for the countries rated a few notches below investment grade. Some of 
the focus countries whose ratings are just below investment grade have savings rates below 5 percent (see 
chapter 1). Lesotho and Cape Verde have negative savings rates.  
Credit ratings also indicate the ability to raise external finance and show its likely associated cost. 
Investment grade countries (rated BBB- or higher) such as South Africa, Namibia, Chile, and Malaysia 
have easier and cheaper access to external finance than non-investment grade countries. Further 
subdividing the latter group into three groups, countries with a rating just below investment grade, yet 
above a B rating, would still have access to external finance at reasonable rates: Lesotho (BB-), Nigeria 
(BB-),
74 Cape Verde (B+), Ghana (B+), Kenya (B+), and Senegal (B+). While the external debt market 
would theoretically be open to the countries with single B ratings, the cost of raising external finance 
would be much higher: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mozambique, and Uganda. Countries with 
investment grade ratings of B- and lower would have problems raising external term finance: Malawi (B-) 
and Rwanda (B-). 
In September 2007, Ghana became the first HIPC beneficiary country to tap international private 
capital markets, via a $750 million, 10-year Eurobond issue, with an 8 percent coupon. Although the bond 
has not been specifically designated as an infrastructure bond, the bond’s prospectus and statements by 
Ghanaian officials suggest that proceeds from the issue are intended to finance infrastructure projects with 
high rates of return in the transport and energy sectors. Part of the proceeds are also to be channeled into 
public-private partnerships, according to the bond’s prospectus. The bond was listed on the London Stock 
Exchange shortly after issuance. The bond was rated B+ by S&P and Fitch, in line with the rating 
assigned to Ghana’s long-term foreign currency sovereign debt in 2006 by these ratings agencies. The 
landmark U.S.-dollar-denominated issue was reportedly four times oversubscribed. Some 40 percent was 
placed with U.S. investors, 36 percent with U.K. investors, and the remainder with European, Middle 
East, and Asian investors. 
Some of the other focus countries that have obtained sovereign credit ratings and received debt relief 
under MDRI/HIPC initiatives were reportedly considering tapping external private bond markets. Nigeria, 
Kenya, and Zambia have indicated intentions to access international capital markets to launch debut 
sovereign bonds at some point in future. Although the debt relief under the MDRI has increased the 
capacity of a number of its beneficiary countries to raise private external financing, it was considered 
unlikely as of mid-2008 that many others would do so in the near term, particularly given the higher costs 
of doing so in the tighter external financing conditions.  
There could be an improved ability for focus countries to finance infrastructure through local 
financial markets that may derive from a sovereign credit rating—even for those countries whose rating 
                                                 
74 When Nigeria received its initial BB- rating in 2006, market analysts tended to react to this rating as a sign of 
growing international confidence in the economy. 76 
 
precludes them from accessing international capital markets in the foreseeable future. The enhanced 
public-sector transparency that is associated with the ratings application process and the periodic 
reporting subsequently required could lead to improved governance and macroeconomic policies and 
conditions. Accountable, prudent fiscal performance could clear the way for more domestic private 
financing of infrastructure projects. Dependable domestic sources of finance would carry less risk of 
asset-liability mismatch than external financing because infrastructure providers such as 
telecommunications enterprises and utilities tend to have their revenues denominated in local currency. 
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Appendix 2   Basic macroeconomic data 
Appendix table A2.1   Macroeconomic stability: Focus countries and comparators 
As of end-2006 or most recent available (US$ millions) /1 
  





savings as % of GDP 
/a Inflation  /b 
Benin 5,195  298  7  4 
Burkina Faso  5,653  565  9  2 
Cameroon 18,661  3160  17  2 
Cape Verde  919  –25  –2  0 
Chad 6,004  2750  42  8 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  7,170  398  5  21 
Côte d’Ivoire  17,224  4820  28  2 
Ethiopia 13,271  –813  –6  12 
Ghana 11,190  1000  8  11 
Kenya 23,404  1710  8  14 
Lesotho 1,675  –103  –7  3 
Madagascar 5,451  748  14  11 
Malawi 2,212  –189  –8  14 
Mozambique 7,606  1540  20  7 
Namibia 6,398  2180  34  5 
Niger 3,552  317  9  0 
Nigeria 98,756  38,400  40  8 
Rwanda 2,139  40  2  9 
Senegal 8,309  790  9  2 
South Africa  254,061  41,200  16  5 
Sudan 37,185  5,310  14  8 
Tanzania 13,207  1,540  12  10 
Uganda 9,117  738  8  7 
Zambia 10,440  1,970  18  18 
Chile 135,797  36,700  31  3 
Malaysia 148,764  62,300  42  4 
Lower-income AICD /c  48,601  16,183  33  9 
Lower-middle-income AICD /d  14,205  2,630  19  3 
Upper-middle-income AICD /e  254,061  41,200  16  5 
Oil exporters /f  77,329  29,409  36  7 
Non-oil exporters (excl. SA)  16,761  1,884  28  10 
Non-resource rich AICD /g  17,595  1,866  29  10 
AICD excl. South Africa  45,776  15,070  32  8 78 
 
Sources: GEM and WDI databases (October 2007), with the exception of gross domestic savings data for Burkina Faso (sourced from IMF 
2007d). 
a. Data for 2006 with the following exceptions: GDP data for Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and Rwanda are for 2005. Gross 
domestic savings data for Benin, Chile, Niger, and Nigeria are for 2005. 
b. Inflation rates are for 2006 with the exception of Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan, and Zambia (2005). 
c. Low-income AICD countries comprise Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Madagascra, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia.        
  
d. Lower-middle-income AICD countries comprise Cameroon, Cape Verde, Lesotho, and Namibia.           
e. Upper middle-income countries comprise South Africa.           
f. Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria. 
g. All AICD countries except Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivôire, Namibia, Nigeria, and Zambia. 79 
 
 
Appendix table A2.2   Macroeconomic stability: Focus countries and comparators 




debt (as % 
GDP) 
External 





(%)  Fitch Moody’s 
Standard and 
Poor’s 
   2004 2005 2005 2006  Sep–07  Sep–07 Sep–07 
Benin 47  43  5  4  B  n.a.  B/Stable/B 
Burkina Faso  41  40  6  2  n.a.  n.a.  B/Positive/B 
Cameroon 66  42  2  —  B  n.a.  B/Stable/B 
Cape Verde  55  56  0  —  B+  n.a.  n.a. 
Chad 40  30 8 —  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  179  149 21  — n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Côte d’Ivoire  76  66 4  2  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Ethiopia 82  56 12 — n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Ghana 79  63 15 11 B+  n.a.  B+/Stable/B 
Kenya 42  33 10 14  n.a.  n.a.  B+/Stable/B 
Lesotho 58  48 3 —  BB–  n.a.  n.a. 
Madagascar 79  69 19 11  n.a.  n.a.  B/Stable/B 
Malawi 182  152 15  14 B– n.a.  n.a. 
Mozambique 76  77 7 — B  n.a.  B/Positive/B 
Namibia —  — 2 5  BBB–  n.a.  n.a. 
Niger 63  58 8  0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Nigeria 50  22 18  8 BB–  n.a.  BB–/Stable/B 
Rwanda 90  71 9 —  B–  n.a.  n.a. 
Senegal 51  46 2  2  n.a.  n.a.  B+/Negative/B 
South Africa  13  13 3  5  BBB+  Baa1  BBB+/Stable/A–2 
Sudan 92  67 8 —  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Tanzania 72  64 9 10  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Uganda 71  51 8  7 B  n.a.  n.a. 
Zambia 135  78 18 — n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Chile —  39 3  3 A A2  A/Positive/A–1 
Malaysia —  39  3  4  A–  A3  A–/Positive/A–2 
Low-income AICD/a  69  47  13  6       
Lower-middle-income AICD/b  49  33  2  1       
Upper-middle-income AICD/c  13.4  12.8  3.4  4.6       
Oil exporters /d  55.5  30.4  13.8  6.4       
Non-oil exporters (excl. South Africa)  76.3  60.6  10.0  4.7       
Non-resource rich AICD /e  77  62  10  5       
AICD excl. South Africa  67  46.1  12  5       80 
 
Sources: World Development Indicators database (downloaded 9/07 and 10/5/07) unless otherwise noted. Ratings sourced from Fitch, 
Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s (downloaded form each ratings agency website in Sept. 2007). 
a. Low-income AICD countries comprise Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia.  
b. Lower-middle-income AICD countries comprise Cameroon, Cape Verde, Lesotho, and Namibia.  
c. Upper middle-income countries comprise South Africa. 
d. Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria. 
e. All AICD countries except Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivôire, Namibia, Nigeria, and Zambia.  
— = Not available; n.a. = Not applicable. 
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Appendix table A2.3   Domestic debt and private bank credit 
  
Gross domestic public debt as 
% GDP 
Private credit by deposit 
money banks as % of GDP 
   2005  end-2006 
Benin 3  16 
Burkina Faso  4  19 
Cameroon —  9 
Cape Verde  34  64 
Chad 5  3 
Côte d’Ivoire  —  15 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  8  2 
Ethiopia 46  23 
Ghana 20  20 
Kenya 22  25 
Lesotho 7  8 
Madagascar —  11 
Malawi 3  9 
Mozambique —  11 
Namibia 28  62 
Niger —  9 
Nigeria 11  13 
Rwanda —  14 
Senegal —  27 
South Africa  30  76 
Sudan —  14 
Tanzania 17  12 
Uganda 12  8 
Zambia 16  8 
Source: World Bank, WDI database. 




Appendix 3    Official development assistance as a 
source of infrastructure financing 
External financing can offer an alternative source of financing of infrastructural projects, access to 
which becomes particularly critical for countries that have poor infrastructure and underdeveloped local 
financial markets. These countries tend to have lower macroeconomic performance and overall 
macroeconomic stability, rendering access to private sources of external finance prohibitively costly or 
impossible. In such cases, official development assistance (ODA) is often the only available source of 
external financing for infrastructure development.  
Thus far, in the majority of these countries, most of the financing from nonlocal sources tends to 
continue to take the form of ODA, although private capital flows have been increasing. Privately sourced 
external financing does not act as much of a competitive spur to local financing sources (with the major 
exception of South Africa), although this has begun to change in the banking sectors of some countries.  
ODA remains a critical source of external financing, particularly for countries with very low levels of 
financial intermediation (table A3.1). The three largest recipients of ODA (as a percentage of GDP) in 
2005—Malawi and postconflict countries Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—all had 
private-credit-to-GDP ratios below 15 percent. Similarly, those countries with relatively high levels of 
financial intermediation as indicated by the private-credit-to-GDP ratio—South Africa, Cape Verde, and 
Namibia—received close to nil (South Africa) or low levels of ODA (Cape Verde and Namibia). There 
were, of course, some countries that both received low levels of ODA and had low private credit to GDP 
ratios. This latter group includes resource-rich countries: Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Zambia).  
Ranked sixth in terms of ODA as a percentage of GDP among the focus countries in 2005, Ethiopia 
allotted the largest amount of ODA ($459.4 million in current U.S. dollars) to infrastructure financing 
among the focus countries, up from $343 million in 2004. The most recently available data providing a 
breakdown by type of infrastructure projects financed by ODA, for 2004, show that $202.6 million (59 
percent) went toward transport and $113.4 million went to water and sanitation.  
Kenya used the largest amount of ODA for infrastructure financing in 2004. Forty percent of the 
$517.7 million went to transport infrastructure projects. Although its share of ODA expressed as a 
percentage of GDP remained stable at around 4 percent over 2004–05, Kenya saw a significant decline in 
the amount ODA used for infrastructure financing in 2005, to $202.4 million.  83 
 
Appendix table A3.1  Official development assistance and infrastructure investment needs 
Country 

















Total ODA and 
official aid (as % 
GDP) 
Private credit by 
deposit money 
banks and other 
financial 
institutions as % 
GDP 
    2001 2004 2005 2005 2005 2006 
Benin  31.6 218.3 182.7  35  8  16 
Burkina  Faso  139.2  188.3  64.5 11 13 19 
Cameroon  120.3 16.7 45.1  2  2  9 
Cape Verde  13.5  13.5  156.5  170  16  64 
Chad 31.8  26.3  161.2  27  7  3 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  14.6  11.2  102.7  13  26  2 
Côte  d’Ivoire  15.3 0.6 0.4  0.02  1  15 
Ethiopia  212.2 343.0 459.4  35  17  27 
Ghana  282.7 402.8 160.6  14  10  20 
Kenya  123.4 517.7 202.4  9  4  26 
Lesotho  5.4 34.9 48.7  29  5  8 
Madagascar  46.9 147.6 192.3  35  18  11 
Malawi  41.8 29.8 58.7  27  28  12 
Mozambique  303.3 179.6 222.8  29  19  11 
Namibia  17.9 30.1 26.6  4 2  62 
Niger  64.2  32.3  134.2 38 15  9 
Nigeria  114.4 230.7 381.3  3  7  13 
Rwanda  2.9 30.6 74.5  30  27  14 
Senegal 222.7  71.7  242.2  29  8  27 
South  Africa  15.4 75.7 38.1  0.1  0  145 
Sudan  4.1 10.9 18.2  0.5  7  14 
Tanzania  427.2 368.5 289.8  22  12  12 
Uganda  324.6 150.0 221.5  24  14  8 
Zambia 52.6  211.6  69.2  7  13  8 
Sources: World Bank staff estimates based on data sourced from the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation of Economic Co-
operation and Development; ODA and official aid as a percentage of GDP sourced from World Bank, WDI. 
a. For purposes of the AICD, the World Bank Sustainable Development Department (Africa Region) has estimated infrastructure investment 













This study is part of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD), a 
project designed to expand the world’s knowledge of physical infrastructure in 
Africa. AICD will provide a baseline against which future improvements in 
infrastructure services can be measured, making it possible to monitor the 
results achieved from donor support. It should also provide a more solid 
empirical foundation for prioritizing investments and designing policy reforms 
in the infrastructure sectors in Africa.  
AICD will produce a series of reports (such as this one) that provide an 
overview of the status of public expenditure, investment needs, and sector 
performance in each of the main infrastructure sectors, including energy, 
information and communication technologies, irrigation, transport, and water 
and sanitation. The World Bank will publish a summary of AICD’s findings in 
July 2009. The underlying data will be made available to the public through an 
interactive Web site allowing users to download customized data reports and 
perform simple simulation exercises. 
The first phase of AICD focuses on 24 countries that together account for 85 
percent of the gross domestic product, population, and infrastructure aid flows 
of Sub-Saharan Africa. The countries are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, 
Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zambia. Under a second phase of the project, coverage will be expanded to 
include additional countries. 
AICD is being implemented by the World Bank on behalf of a steering 
committee that represents the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), Africa’s regional economic communities, the African 
Development Bank, and major infrastructure donors. AICD grew from an idea 
presented at the inaugural meeting of the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, 
held in London in October 2005.  
Financing for AICD is provided by a multi-donor trust fund to which the main 
contributors are the Department for International Development (United 
Kingdom), the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, Agence 
Française de Développement, and the European Commission. A group of 
distinguished peer reviewers from policy making and academic circles in 
Africa and beyond reviews all of the major outputs of the study, with a view to 
assuring the technical quality of the work.  
This and other papers analyzing key infrastructure topics, as well as the 
underlying data sources described above, will be available for download from 
www.infrastructureafrica.org. Freestanding summaries are available in English 
and French. 
Inquiries concerning the availability of datasets should be directed to 
vfoster@worldbank.org. 
 